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INTRODUCTION
Since 1984, over 65,000 people have been killed as a result of the
Government of Sri Lanka's attempt to preserve its territorial integrity and
secure its sovereign interests against the competing efforts of the Tamil rebels
to exercise their right of self-determination and establish a self-governing
region within Sri Lanka. In Sudan, nearly two million people have been killed
during the war of secession. In Bosnia, 250,000 civilians were killed and over
one million displaced in a campaign of genocide carried out by Serbia in
response to Bosnia's declaration of independence from the former Yugoslavia.
In the period between 1956 and 2002, there were seventy-five instances of
states involved in some form of self-determination or sovereignty-based
conflict. By 2002, only twelve of these conflicts had been resolved through
uncontested agreements. Another twelve had been resolved through military
victory. The remainder were ongoing (twenty-two), or were merely
"contained" (twenty-nine), usually as a result of the deployment of
international peacekeepers. The average duration of these continuing conflicts
is nearly thirty years. I
There are four disturbing characteristics of these sovereignty-based
conflicts. First, as evidenced by the preceding statistics, they are exceedingly
difficult to resolve. Only ten sovereignty-based conflicts have been settled
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1 CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, PEACE AND
CONFLICT 2003: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ARMED CONFLICTS, SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS
AND DEMOCRACY 26-30 (2003), available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/pc03print.pdf (last
visited Mar. 9, 2004) [hereinafter PEACE AND CONFLICT 2003].
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through mutual agreement since 1965,2 with five of these being settled by
granting independence to the substate entity.3
Second, sovereignty-based conflicts frequently give rise to terrorism. Over
one third of the Specially Designated Global Terrorists identified by the United
States Department of Treasury are associated with self-determination
movements. 4 Of increasing concern is the globalization of terrorism arising
from sovereignty-based conflicts in terms of methods, mission, and
cooperation. For instance, while the Tamil Tigers have limited their attacks to
the island of Sri Lanka, they are credited with the dubious accomplishment of
perfecting a method of suicide bombing that has been widely replicated in
other conflicts. 5 The chronic status of the Israel/Palestine conflict has fostered
a wave of "mission solidarity," resulting in the proliferation of dangerous
Islamic groups who readily resort to terrorism as a means of political
expression.6 In the Mindanao region of the Philippines, global terrorists, such
as Jemaah Islamiyah, are cooperating with Moro rebels in their fight against
the Philippine government in exchange for the use of territory for training and
logistical purposes. 7
Third, sovereignty-based conflicts often involve the commission of
massive human rights violations. For instance, reports indicate that Indonesian
forces seeking to suppress separatist forces in the province of Ache have killed
over five thousand civilians. 8 In the Western Sahara, over fifty thousand
refugees have lived for twenty years in refugee camps in neighboring Algeria.
As a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan, nearly one million refugees have spent the last ten years in refugee
camps near their former homes. 9
2 Id.
3 Id. at 28, 57-62.
4 OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, SPECIALLY
DESIGNATED AND BLOCKED PERSONS (Mar. 22, 2004), available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/actions/2004cuma.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2004). Some of
the groups on the list are the Islamic International Brigade and the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment
in Chechnya, Abu Nidal and Hamas in Palestine, Abu Sayaf and the Moro Liberation Front in the
Philippines, Basque Fatherland and Liberty in the Basque Region of Spain, and both the Ulster
Freedom Fighters and the Continuity IRA in Northern Ireland.
5 Thomas L. Friedman, Lessons from Sri Lanka, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2003, at A17.
6 David Ucko & Christopher Langton, Suicide Attacks: A Tactical Weapon System, PRESS
REVIEW 95, Apr. 24, 2002, available at http://www.mafhoum.com/press3/96P8.htm. (last visited Mar.
9, 2004).
7 See Philippines Tightens Surveillance in Mindanao Amid Reports of JI Training, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC, May 22, 2004, available at 2004 WL 78281572.
8 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, INDONESIA: THE WAR tN ACEH (2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/aceh/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2004) (providing an overview of the
conflict and detailing the human rights concerns and civilian casualties associated with it).
9 There are numerous reports and literature describing the particularly violent nature of
sovereignty-based conflicts. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA:
SARAJEVO (1994), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1994/bosnia3 (last visited Mar. 15, 2004);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHECHNYA-MEMORANDUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CHECHNYA (2002), available at
http://www.hrw.org/un/unchr-chechnya.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2004); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
CIVILIAN DEVASTATION: ABUSES BY ALL PARTIES IN THE WAR IN SOUTHERN SUDAN (1994),
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/sudan (last visited Mar. 15, 2004); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, INDONESIA: HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRO INDEPENDENCE ACTIONS IN PAPUA 1999-2000
(2000), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/papua (last visited Mar. 15, 2004); HUMAN
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Fourth, existing international legal norms and principles are often of little
practical relevance to parties and mediators seeking to resolve these conflicts.
The principle of sovereignty is frequently relied upon by states to prevent other
states or international organizations from taking an active role in resolving a
sovereignty-based conflict, as in the case of the Russian response to the
Chechnya conflict. Similarly, groups seeking independence from a state
frequently rely on the doctrine of self-determination to support their claim for
independence, as in the case of Western Sahara and Nagorno-Karabakh.
The intensity and severity of sovereignty-based conflicts, their relationship
to increasing levels of terrorism, and the lack of effective legal norms and
principles have given rise to the need for a new approach to resolving
sovereignty-based conflicts. This need is increasingly being met by the
emerging conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty. In seven recent
peace agreements concerning sovereignty-based conflicts, the parties have
relied upon the approach of earned sovereignty.10 In two of the major
outstanding conflicts, earned sovereignty forms the basis of the proposed
agreement.ll The approach of earned sovereignty has been aided in its
development by the increasing efforts of international organizations and
powerful states to undertake global conflict management, including a
willingness to aid states in conflict resolution and undertake institution
building in conflict-affected areas. 12
Despite the increasing ad hoc reliance on the approach of earned
sovereignty by mediators and parties to conflict, there is scant scholarly
commentary as to the precise nature of the approach, the political debate
RIGHTS WATCH, INDONESIA: IMPUNITY VERSUS ACCOUNTABILITY FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS (2001), available at http://www.cisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1460&l=1 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2004); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR: DETERIORATING HUMAN
RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR (1995), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/indonesi.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2004); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ISRAEL/PALESTINE, PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY:
HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY (1997), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/palestina/Israel.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2004); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, PAPUA NEW GUINEA-BOUGAINVILLE: THE FORGOTTEN HUMAN RIGHTS TRAGEDY
(1997), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/index/Engasa340011997?open&of-ENG-
PNG (last visited Mar. 16, 2004); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SRI LANKA: STOP KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS
(1995), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Srilanka.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2004);
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNDER ORDERS: WAR CRIMES IN KOSOVO (2001), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/200 l/kosovo (last visited Mar. 15, 2004); INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP,
VIOLENCE IN KOSOVO: WHO'S KILLING WHOM? (1999), at
http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1581&1=1 (last visited Mar. 15, 2004); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO): PERSECUTION PERSISTS: HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATIONS IN KOSOVO (1996), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Serbia.htm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2004).
10 The seven territories are Serbia and Montenegro, East Timor, Northern Ireland, Bougainville,
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sudan.
II The two territories are Israel/Palestine and Western Sahara.
12 Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has demonstrated an ever-
increasing role in conflict resolution. First, the internationalization of human rights led to a
progressive increase in the number of interventions to end conflicts involving massive human rights
violations. This phenomenon indicates the progressive erosion of the subject of human rights from the
domestic jurisdiction of states and its inclusion in matters of international concern. Additionally, since
the 1990s, the international community has embarked on the new and more complex task of
responding to conflict by transforming the distressed territories into a favorable environment to realize
stable democracies. See generally Samuel H. Barnes, The Contribution of Democracy to Postconflict
Societies, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 86 (2001) (exploring the sucesses and failures of postconflict transitions
to democracy).
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surrounding its use, and its utility for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. 13
To initiate the debate, the Public International Law & Policy Group, in
cooperation with the Denver University School of Law, hosted a daylong
roundtable discussion focused on the emerging trend of earned sovereignty and
its potential utility for resolving ongoing sovereignty-based conflicts. The
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy published the preliminary
observations presented during the roundtable. 14 This Article draws from that
series of papers in an effort to further refine the understanding of the approach
of earned sovereignty.
In particular this Article extends the debate by parsing out and clearly
defining the various elements of the earned sovereignty approach as they have
been developed and employed in previous peace agreements. A clear
understanding of the elements of the approach and how they have been
employed to facilitate the peaceful resolution of previous conflicts will
enhance the ability of peace negotiators and parties to effectively apply the
approach in future conflicts where relevant. To facilitate a comprehensive
understanding of the earned sovereignty approach and its potential utility in
future conflict resolution efforts, this Article also seeks to provide a sense of
the political debate surrounding the advantages and risks associated with the
approach.
Earned sovereignty, as developed in recent state practice, entails the
conditional and progressive devolution of sovereign powers and authority from
a state to a substate entity under international supervision. Earned sovereignty
most naturally develops within a peace process as a multistage approach to
address the issue of the final political status of the substate entity. As an
emerging conflict resolution approach, earned sovereignty is defined by three
core elements: shared sovereignty, institution building, and a determination of
final status. To increase the flexibility necessary to deal with the political
fragilities of peace processes, and with the historical diversity of different
conflicts, earned sovereignty may also encompass three additional elements:
phased sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, and constrained sovereignty.
These optional elements further enhance the applicability of earned
sovereignty to the circumstances of a particular conflict and allow for the
modification or development of the approach as necessary to meet the needs of
the parties.
The emergence of earned sovereignty has occurred within the larger
political debate concerning the most appropriate means for resolving
sovereignty-based conflicts. On both sides of the debate are states, substates,
diplomats, and policy analysts who prefer either sovereignty or self-
determination as the guiding principle for resolving sovereignty-based
conflicts. Those who prefer an approach based on the priority of sovereignty
are likely to perceive earned sovereignty as potentially destabilizing to the
13 See generally Karen Heymann, Earned Sovereignty for Kashmir: The Legal Methodology to
Avoiding a Nuclear Holocaust, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 153 (2003) (analyzing the approach of
earned sovereignty when applied to a specific conflict).
14 See generally James R. Hooper & Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The Political
Dimension, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 355 (2003); Paul R. Williams, Earned Sovereignty: The
Road to Resolving the Conflict Over Kosovo's Final Status, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 387
(2003).
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current international order by promoting the separation of substate entities
from their parent states. Those who prefer an approach based on the primacy
of the right of self-determination are likely to perceive earned sovereignty as a
means for raising the bar for independence. In fact, earned sovereignty seeks
to bridge these two approaches by providing a mechanism whereby some
substate entities may be guided through a process of transition to statehood or
heightened autonomy in such a way so as not to undermine the legitimate
interests of parent states and of the international community.
Given that the use of the earned sovereignty approach generally requires
the consent of the state and substate entities that are party to a conflict, the
precise dimensions of the approach as applied to a particular conflict are
shaped by the political concerns of each party involved. For instance, concerns
may relate to the protection of majority group members who might become a
minority within a new state. They may also relate to the impact that
heightened autonomy or independence for the substate entity may have on the
democratic and economic reform process in the parent state. These concerns
may affect the conditions employed during the process, as well as the length of
the process.
To structure an inquiry into the emerging approach of earned sovereignty,
this Article is divided as follows: Part I briefly discusses the fundamental legal
principles of sovereignty and self-determination which underlie the conflict
resolution approaches of "sovereignty first" and "self-determination first."
Reference will be made to a number of current conflicts to illustrate the
ongoing tension between these two approaches and their increasing lack of
utility for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. Parts II and III draw upon
recent final and proposed peace agreements to illustrate the three core and
three optional elements of earned sovereignty. Included are the agreements
reached in Serbia and Montenegro, East Timor, Northern Ireland,
Bougainville, Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sudan, as well as the proposed
agreements introduced in Israel and the Western Sahara. Finally, Part IV
examines the progressive development of the earned sovereignty approach as a
means for resolving the sovereignty-based conflict between Kosovo and
Serbia. Particular attention will be paid to the political considerations that
have shaped the parameters of the earned sovereignty approach as applied to
Kosovo.
It is important to clarify that earned sovereignty is not perceived by the
authors to be a panacea for sovereignty-based conflicts. As such, this Article
does not argue that earned sovereignty should be used as the exclusive
approach to resolving sovereignty-based conflicts, but instead seeks only to
promote the more effective utilization of the approach.
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
I. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING SOVEREIGNTY-
BASED CONFLICTS: SOVEREIGNTY VS. SELF-DETERMINATION
Traditional approaches to resolving sovereignty-based conflicts may be
characterized as falling within the spectrum of the "sovereignty first"
approach, based primarily upon the principles of sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and political independence, or the "self-determination first"
approach, based upon the legal principles relating to self-determination and the
protection of human rights.
The predominant "sovereignty first" approach is generally relied upon by
states wishing to preserve their territorial integrity, or by third-party states that
fear that the creation of too many new states may undermine international
stability or set a precedent that may be used by secessionist movements within
their state. In this approach, sovereignty is regarded as the essential element
of the political existence of a state, and forms the basis for international
relations. 15 A core attribute of sovereignty is the exclusive jurisdiction of a
state to exercise political power and authority within its own borders and to
exercise all rights necessary to preserve its territorial integrity from external
and internal threats.16 Mediators adopting the "sovereignty first" approach
often find themselves in a position of accommodating, and in some instances
appeasing, aggressor regimes.17
15 The literature on sovereignty is vast. For some recent contributions, see generally HURST
HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF
CONFLICTING RIGHTS (rev. ed. 1996); HIDEAKI SHINODA, REEXAMINING SOVEREIGNTY: FROM
CLASSICAL THEORY TO THE GLOBAL AGE (2000); Antony Anghie, Colonialism and the Birth of
International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations,
34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513 (2002); Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in
International Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 417 (1999); Ronald A. Brand, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First
Century: External Sovereignty and International Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1685, 1687-88 (1995);
Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the
Future of International Law, 43 VA J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty in a
Positive Law Context, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 417, 420-22 (2000); Johan D. van der Vyver,
Sovereignty and Human Rights in Constitutional and International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 321,
321-443 (1991). For an in-depth analysis on sovereignty in contemporary international law, see also
Ruth Lapidoth, Redefining Authority: The Past, Present and Future of Sovereignty in International
Law, HARV. INT'L REV., Summer 1995, at 8.
16 See generally CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(1979) (postulating that a theory of international politics should include a revised principle of state
autonomy based on the justice of a state's domestic institutions and a principle of international
distributive justice). Specifically, the U.N. Charter recognizes the centrality of sovereignty through its
principle of noninterference, by virtue of which states are considered independent in all matters of
internal politics and free to determine their political life without undue interference by other states.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. The U.N. Charter expresses the principle of noninterference in relation
with the domestic jurisdiction of member states and as a corollary of principle of sovereign equality of
all members of the United Nations. Id.
Despite its perceived value, absolute sovereignty is more the exception than the rule in state
practice. As detailed by Stephen Krasner, there are numerous examples of quasisovereign states
through the last two centuries, and many examples of states that have exercised only partial
sovereignty. Moreover, since World War II the principle of sovereignty has been progressively
eroded. In particular, the multilateral trend of the international community to pursue some of its goals
collectively and through international institutions results in states frequently ceding portions of their
sovereign powers. For an extensive analysis of sovereignty in contemporary international law, see
generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
17 See Jane M. 0. Sharp, Appeasement, Intervention and the Future of Europe, in MILITARY
INTERVENTION IN EUROPEAN CONFLICTS 49 (Lawrence Freedman ed., 1994); Ed Vulliamy, Bosnia:
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The "self-determination first" approach is frequently relied upon by
secessionist movements, and has been sympathetically received by small states
without significant minority populations. This approach, which evolved within
the context of decolonization, 18 is based upon the principle that dependent
peoples are entitled to exercise self-government.19 Under this approach, all
self-identified groups with a coherent identity and connection to a defined
territory are entitled to collectively determine their political destiny in a
democratic fashion and to be free from systematic persecution. 20  Self-
government is generally attained through the creation of an autonomous
province within the parent state, although it may in some limited circumstances
be attained through secession.2 1
Increasingly, these two approaches fail to offer satisfactory options for
structuring the peaceful resolution of sovereignty-based conflicts, as they
frequently result in political gridlock and continued violence. The
"sovereignty first" approach is relied upon by the parent state, and frequently
the international community, to argue for the retention of the substate entity
within the parent state and to justify the use of force to accomplish that
The Crime of Appeasement, INT'L AFF., Jan. 1998, at 80. For a review of the preference of the U.N.
Secretary General for a negotiated outcome and his aversion to the use of force against aggression in
the former Yugoslavia, see Georgie Anne Geyer, How the Conscience of the West Was Lost, in THE
CONCEIT OF INNOCENCE: LOSING THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WEST IN THE WAR AGAINST BOSNIA 74,
107-08 (Stjepan G. Me~tovic & Akbar S. Ahmed eds., 1997).
18 To facilitate and justify the process of independence of former colonies, the 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") enshrined the right to external self-
determination, reinforcing the concept that emerged in the U.N. Charter. Thus, the ICCPR recognized
the right of dependent territories to achieve independent statehood from foreign colonial rule and
affirmed an obligation of member states to refrain from interfering with the independence of other
nations. The ICCPR also enshrined a limited right to internal self-determination, providing the right
of all the people to freely choose rulers and governments. International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art. 1, para. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
In addition to treaty law, the right to self-determination is also widely considered to be part of
customary international law. As evidence of opiniojuris, a series of resolutions adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly can be recalled. General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 1541, as well as the
Declaration on Friendly Relations adopted in 1970, all expressed the principle of self-determination by
calling for the right of non-self-goveming territories to freely choose their international status and the
manner in which their right to (external) self-determination should be implemented. G.A. Res. 1514,
U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/Res/1514 (XV) (1960); G.A. Res. 1541,
U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, U.N. Doc. A/Res/1541 (XV) (1960); G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (XXV) (1970) [hereinafter
Declaration on Friendly Relations]. Finally, the International Court of Justice has in limited
circumstances recognized self-determination as a rule of customary international law, applicable to
and binding on all states. See, e.g., East Timor Case (Port. v. Austl.) 1995 1.C.J. 90, para. 29 (June
30).
19 Although its interpretation has been long debated and contested, the principle of self-
determination is mentioned in the U.N. Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, art. 55, art. 73; see also
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 111-13
(1994). Self-determination has been further codified in a number of international instruments. See,
e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200A (XXI) (1966) ("All peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.").
20 Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 18, at 121.
21 Despite its wide recognition, the principle of self-determination does not necessarily
guarantee independence to those substate entities seeking to secede from an internationally recognized
state. The response of the international community to these entities' demands has varied considerably.
Indeed, the perceived legitimacy of self-determination claims bears a relationship to the degree of
representative government in the state. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees Of Self-Determination
In The United Nations Era, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 304, 308 (1994).
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objective. For instance, the mantra of sovereignty has been used by states to
shield themselves from international action resulting from human rights abuses
committed as part of their attempts to stifle self-determination movements.
Examples of this include the Iraqi Anfal campaigns against the Kurds, the
violation of Kurdish human rights in Turkey, the Russian campaign in
Chechnya,22 the targeting of Christians in southern Sudan, and Indonesia's
brutal occupation of East Timor, 23 as well as its recent campaign in Aceh. 24
Despite the nonabsolute nature of sovereignty, the international community
also frequently clings to the misconception of absolute sovereignty in the
context of sovereignty-based conflicts-with dire consequences. 25
The "self-determination first" approach is relied upon by the substate
entity to support a claim for heightened autonomy or secession, and to justify
the use of force to defend its people against the national army or police force.
For instance, the mantra of self-determination has been used to justify the use
of armed force, and frequently terrorism, by groups such as the Tamil Tigers,
the Free Aceh Movement, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and the Jammu
Kashmir Liberation Front in their efforts to achieve greater autonomy within or
independence from the parent state.
Given the rather exclusive nature of the two primary approaches, their
utility has been reduced to little more than legal and political shields behind
which states and substate entities justify their actions. The approach of earned
sovereignty is an attempt to bridge the impasse between the two approaches of
"sovereignty first" and "self-determination first," and to create an opportunity
to resolve the conflicts and reduce the accompanying human rights violations
and spread of terrorism.
II. EARNED SOVEREIGNTY: AN EMERGING CONFLICT
RESOLUTION APPROACH
Earned sovereignty is designed to create an opportunity for resolving
sovereignty-based conflicts by providing for the managed devolution of
22 For an analysis of the conflict, see generally Lester W. Grau & Jacob W. Kipp, Chechen
Nationalism and the Tragedy of the Struggle for Independence, 10 NAT'L STRATEGY F. REV. 1
(2000); Thomas de Waal, Chechnya's Endless War, BBC NEWS EUROPE, Apr. 23, 2001, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/1292799.stm (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
23 For a general background on the conflict, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, INDONESIA/EAST
TIMOR: DETERIORATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST TIMOR (1995), supra note 8.
24 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ACEH UNDER MARTIAL LAW: INSIDE THE SECRET
WAR (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/indonesial203/ (last visited Mar. 16,
2004). The report details human rights abuses and Indonesia's largely successful attempt to control
information by prohibiting human rights and humanitarian organizations from entering Aceh, and by
preventing international news organizations from moving beyond the provincial capital, Banda Aceh.
25 The most significant example of this "sovereignty first" response to a sovereignty-based
conflict was the approach of the European Union and the United States toward the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia. The extreme support for the sanctity of Yugoslavian territorial integrity worsened
and prolonged the conflict. Only after Serbian forces embarked upon a campaign of genocide, killing
over 250,000 Bosnians and displacing one million, did NATO resolve to use force in a once "internal"
matter. In the Kosovo conflict only a few years latter, NATO was forced to act without U.N. approval
to prevent another attempted genocide by Serbian forces. See PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P.
SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? WAR CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
63-87 (2002).
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sovereign authority and functions from a state to a substate entity. 26 In some
instances, the substate entity may acquire sovereign authority and functions
sufficient to enable it to seek international recognition, while in others the
substate entity may only acquire authority to operate within a stable system of
heightened autonomy.
Earned sovereignty seeks to promote peaceful coexistence between a state
and a substate entity by establishing an equitable and acceptable power sharing
arrangement; it is not intended solely to promote self-determination claims.
Earned sovereignty is a neutral approach that attempts to end conflicts by
reestablishing security and promoting democracy and institution building in
wartorn territories.
As a conflict resolution approach, earned sovereignty has developed as an
inherently flexible process implemented over a variable time period. As noted
in the Introduction, this approach is defined by three core elements: shared
sovereignty, institution building, and a determination of final status. The
process may also encompass three optional elements: phased sovereignty,
conditional sovereignty, and constrained sovereignty. These optional elements
are employed to tailor the earned sovereignty approach to the unique
circumstances of each conflict and to the particular needs of the parties.
A. The Elements of Earned Sovereignty
The first core element is shared sovereignty. Each case of earned
sovereignty is characterized by an initial stage of shared sovereignty, whereby
the state and substate entity may both exercise some sovereign authority and
functions over a defined territory. Sometimes international institutions may
also exercise sovereign authority and functions in addition to, or in lieu of, the
parent state. In rare cases, the international community may exercise shared
sovereignty with an internationally recognized state. In almost all instances, an
international institution is responsible for monitoring the parties' exercise of
their authority and functions.
The second core element is institution building. During the period of
shared sovereignty, prior to the determination of final status, the substate
entity, frequently with the assistance of the international community,
undertakes to construct new institutions for self-government, or modify those
already in existence. The substate entity also works with the international
community to develop the institutional capacity for exercising increased
sovereign authority.
The third core element is the eventual determination of the final status of
the substate entity and its relationship to the parent state. In many instances
the status will be determined by a referendum. In others, it may involve a
negotiated settlement between the state and substate entity, often with
international mediation. Invariably, the determination of final status for the
26 The authority and functions may include the power to collect taxes, control the development
of natural resources, conduct local policing operations, maintain a local army or defense force, enter
into international treaties on certain matters, maintain representative offices abroad, and participate in
some form in international bodies.
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substate entity is conditioned on the consent of the international community in
the form of international recognition.
The first optional element is phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty
entails the accumulation by the substate entity of increasing sovereign
authority and functions over a specified period of time prior to the
determination of final status. The accumulation of sovereign authority and
functions may be correlated with the ability of the substate entity to assume
these powers, as a reward for responsible state behavior, or a combination of
both.
The second optional element is conditional sovereignty. Conditional
sovereignty may be applied to the accumulation of increased sovereign
authority by the substate entity, or it may be applied as a set of standards to be
achieved prior to the determination of the substate entity's final status. These
benchmarks vary depending on the characteristics of the conflict and generally
include conditions, such as protecting human and minority rights, halting
terrorism, developing democratic institutions, instituting the rule of law, and
promoting regional stability. In most cases, the relationship between the
attainment of certain benchmarks and the devolution of authority is not
automatic-it is subject to evaluation by a monitoring authority that often
involves international institutions. Such evaluation allows for a margin of
discretion to determine when and how to successfully push forward the process
of devolving authority.
The third optional element, constrained sovereignty, consists of applying
limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state.
Constrained sovereignty is often required as a guarantee for the parent state
and the international community. For instance, the new entity may be placed
under a continued international administrative and/or military presence, or its
sovereign authority may be limited with respect to the right of undertaking
territorial association with other states.
The state and substate entities almost always adopt the elements of earned
sovereignty by mutual agreement, but in some cases the international
community may support or initiate one or more of the elements of earned
sovereignty against the preferences of the state or substate entity, as in the case
of Kosovo.
B. Earned Sovereignty in Recent International Practice
Recent international practice demonstrates that states involved in
sovereignty-based conflicts are increasingly adopting the earned sovereignty
approach. The following section provides a brief overview of the peace
processes that are attempting-more or less uniformly and without necessarily
encompassing all the outlined elements-to implement earned sovereignty.
Since the degree of actual implementation of earned sovereignty is not equal in
all of these cases (in some cases earned sovereignty has only been proposed),
the following enumeration begins with those cases where the degree of
implementation achieved is greatest, and then proceeds progressively to those
cases where earned sovereignty forms the basis for a proposed agreement.
East Timor. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1272 provided for the
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creation of the U.N. Administration of East Timor after conflict resumed 27 as a
consequence of East Timor's rejection by referendum of Indonesia's proposal
for autonomy within Indonesia.28 The Resolution provided authority for a two-
and-a-half-year period of shared sovereignty between the United Nations and
East Timor, during which time East Timor was able to construct the
institutions necessary for independent self-government. After successfully
meeting certain benchmarks, East Timor was recognized as independent and
was admitted to the United Nations.
Serbia and Montenegro. The Union Treaty between Serbia and
Montenegro, brokered by the European Union, provides for the sharing and/or
devolution of all sovereign authority and functions between the two member
states of Serbia and Montenegro. 29 After three years of shared sovereignty, the
final status of Serbia and Montenegro will be determined through a referendum
on the dissolution of the union. The purpose of the three-year period of shared
sovereignty is to permit the member states time to transform their economic
and democratic systems into viable individual entities and to harmonize them
with European standards.
Northern Ireland The Good Friday Agreement, 30 designed to end the
conflict in Northern Ireland, provides for the creation of Northern Irish
institutions and the interim devolution of substantial power to those
institutions, so long as certain conditions are fulfilled, including the
decommissioning of weapons. The Good Friday Agreement also provides the
people of Northern Ireland with the right to decide the issue of unification with
27 Indonesia occupied East Timor for twenty-five years following the withdrawal of Portugal,
subduing the population and fighting the insurrections of guerrillas fighting for East Timorese
independence. Indonesia allowed a referendum in 1999, permitting a choice between independence
and autonomy. Following a vote calling for independence, loyalists to Indonesia began killing
rampages, prompting the intervention of an Australian-led international peacekeeping force
(International Force East Timor, or Interfet) and leading to governance by a U.N. transitional
administration until East Timor was granted independence in May 2002. See IAN MARTIN, SELF-
DETERMINATION IN EAST TIMOR: THE UNITED NATIONS, THE BALLOT AND INTERNATIONAL
INTERVENTION 15 (2001); Tania Voon, Closing the Gap Between Legitimacy and Legality of
Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from East Timor and Kosovo, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 31 (2002).
28 S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (1999); East Timor Popular Consultation, May 5,
1999, Indon.-Port., U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/513, Annex II1 (1999).
available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/agreeFrame Eng04.html (last visited Mar.
16, 2004); Agreement Regarding the Modalities for the Popular Consultation of the East Timorese
Through Direct Ballot, May 5, 1999, Indon.-Port., U.N. SCOR, 53rd Sess., Annex II, at 24, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/513 (1999), available at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor99/agreement/
agreeFrameEng03.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
29 The Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia broke apart during the 1990s. PEACE AND CONFLICT
2003, supra note 1, at 57-58. The secession of Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina left Serbia and Montenegro as the only remaining areas to comprise the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia after 1992. SERB. & MONT. CONST. (Constitutional Charter of State Union, signed
Feb. 4 2003), available at http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/const-scg (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
30 Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Apr. 10, 1998, Ir.-U.K., available at
http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/publications/223.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Good
Friday Agreement]. Mainly Protestant unionists desired to remain a part of the United Kingdom,
while mostly Catholic communities wanted to join the Republic of Ireland. The conflict started as a
civil rights movement for Catholics and developed into a violent campaign involving paramilitaries
such as the Irish Republican Army ("IRA"), government police, and the army. Attempts at
reconciliation and power sharing were undermined until the 1998 Good Friday Agreement provided
for more autonomy in exchange for concessions from the separatist republicans. For a general history
of the conflict, see DAVID MCKITTRICK & DAVID MCVEA, MAKING SENSE OF THE TROUBLES: THE
STORY OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND (2002).
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the Irish Republic through a referendum to be held in seven years.
Bougainville and Papua New Guinea. The Comprehensive Agreement for
Bougainville ("Bougainville Agreement"), signed at Arawa in August 2001,
establishes an autonomous interim arrangement for Bougainville during which
the two entities will share sovereign authority and certain sovereign functions.
The agreement provides that Bougainville will assume increasing control over
a wide range of powers, functions, personnel, and resources based on
guarantees contained in the national constitution and reflected in a new
Bougainville constitution.31 The assumption of sovereign authority and
functions is conditioned, however, on the progressive implementation of a
weapons disposal plan and on the achievement of good governance standards.
Within a period of ten to fifteen years, and after the completion of the weapons
disposal plan, Bougainville may undertake to secede from Papua New Guinea
via referendum. 32
Bosnia. The Dayton Accords, which brought an end to the Bosnian
conflict, provide that many of the sovereign authorities and functions of the
independent state of Bosnia are to be managed by an internationally appointed
High Representative for an indeterminate period.33 The Accords also provide
for the deployment of international military forces to maintain internal
security.34 While conditional sovereignty is not explicit, the pattern of practice
in Bosnia indicates that the international civilian authority will be discontinued
only upon a showing that Bosnia can adequately function as an ethnically
integrated state.
Kosovo. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 ("Resolution 1244"),
with reference to the Rambouillet Agreement, provided for the interim United
Nations administration of Kosovo with security provided by a NATO-led
force.35 During this interim period, the United Nations exercises near absolute
31 Bougainville Peace Agreement, Aug. 30, 2001, Papua N.G.-Bougainville, available at
http://www.usip.org/library/pafbougainville/bougain_20010830.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2004)
[hereinafter Bougainville Agreement].
The 1998 Lincoln Agreement brought an end to a nine-year battle between Bougainville rebel
forces and the government of Papua New Guinea. The conflict first started as a dispute over the
Pangua copper mine, but evolved into a fight for independence. Approximately twenty thousand
people were killed and thousands more displaced during the conflict. Following the ceasefire, an
agreement was signed in 2001 to establish an autonomous interim arrangement for the island. Id. at
Introduction and Outline, para. 1.
32 Id. § C, paras. 309-312.
33 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35
I.L.M. 75 (1996), available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnialbosagree.html (last
visited Mar. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Dayton Agreement]. The Bosnian war waged between 1992 and
1995 cost approximately 250,000 lives. The conflict was fought between Bosnians who called for an
independent Bosnia with the retention of initial boundaries, Croats who desired to join the
independent Croat state, and Serbs who wished to remain a part of Serb-controlled Yugoslavia
following the break-up of the state. The Dayton Agreement brought an end to the conflict which was
plagued by numerous human rights abuses, separating the country into two distinct entities: a
Croat/Bosniak area and the Serb-controlled Republika Srpska.
34 Id. at Annex 1.
35 Rambouillet Agreement: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, ch.
2, art. I, para. 2, available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/ksvo rambouillet text.html (last
visited Mar. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Rambouillet Agreement]. Violence erupted in 1998 in the Serbian
region of Kosovo as the Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA"), supported by the majority ethnic
Albanians, rebelled against Serbian rule. Kosovo had been an autonomous region until this status was
revoked in 1990 amid a wave of Serbian nationalism. Yugoslavian President Milosevic's harsh
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executive and legislative authority within Kosovo, seeking to build institutions
that will allow for autonomous governance for Kosovo. As these institutions
become more capable of exercising their own authority, the United Nations is
to devolve certain sovereign authorities and functions to the Kosovar
government. The full devolution of authority and the determination of final
status will depend on Kosovo's compliance with standards of democracy and
good governance.
Sudan. The Machakos Protocol provided for the cessation of hostilities
between the Muslim forces of northern Sudan and southern Sudanese Christian
forces. The Protocol also provides an opportunity for the South to determine
its political status, as an independent entity or as part of the Sudan, via
referendum after six years. 36 Following the agreement on basic principles, the
parties agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding concerning numerous
aspects of the structures of government, including aspects of power sharing,
the judiciary, and human rights. 37 Additionally, in September 2003, the
government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army signed a
framework agreement on security arrangements to facilitate humanitarian relief
operations. 38
Israel/Palestine. The Roadmap for Middle East Peace ("Roadmap") was
developed by the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and
Russia ("the Quartet"). It involves a three-phase plan designed to resolve the
conflict in the Middle East by providing for the security of Israel and by
creating a process for the establishment of an independent democratic
Palestine. 39 To accomplish these objectives, the Roadmap provides for the
response to the KLA and the general population prompted NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in
1999. WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra note 25, at 203-04. The United Nations now administers the
region following the Rambouillet Agreement and UNSC Resolution 1244, which kept Kosovo a part
of Yugoslavia, but provided for U.N. administration. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(1999).
36 The Machakos Protocol was signed on July 20, 2002 between the Government of the
Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation
Army. Machakos Protocol, Jul. 20, 2002, at pt. B, para. 2.5, available at
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/sudanmachakos07202002 toc.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
Civil war has been waged between the mainly Muslim North and Animist and Christian South in
Sudan since its 1956 independence except for an eleven-year period of peace. The war has at times
included Sudan's neighbors, including Uganda, Libya, and Egypt, while the war has greatly reduced
living standards throughout the country. The Machakos Protocol provided an end to hostilities and
laid the groundwork for further reconciliation. For further reference on the Sudanese conflict, see
generally INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORKS (1R1N), U.N. OFFICE FOR THE
COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, SUDAN: PEACE TALKS, HUMANITARIAN ACTION
(2002), at http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/sudan/default.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
37 See Memorandum of Understanding between Sudan and the SPLM/A on Aspects of
Structures of Government, November 18, 2002, available at http://www.reliefweb.int/
w/rwb.nsf/vID/BEC9263F8C34B20AC1256C7004FB4A2?OpenDocument (last visited May 13,
2004).
38 See Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period, Sep. 25, 2003, available
at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/sudansecurity_09252003.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
39 James Bennett, U.S. and Partners Present Proposal for Mideast Peace, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2003, at Al; Proposal for "Final and Comprehensive Settlement to Middle East Conflict," N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2003, at A7.
A 1947 U.N. plan for distinct states in the former British Palestine Protectorate for both Israeli
Jews and Palestinian Arabs fell apart and resulted in Israeli control of 77% of the territory. See
Kathleen A. Cavanaugh, Selective Justice: The Case of Israel and the Occupied Territories, 26
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 934, 937-38 (2003). Confrontation and violence between the parties for control
of the entire area has been common since, and the 1967 war in which Israel seized the remaining Arab
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creation of Palestinian institutions of self-government, followed by the
international recognition of an independent Palestine with provisional borders.
In addition, there will be a subsequent agreement upon final borders and issues
such as refugees and the status of Jerusalem. Progression through these phases
is contingent on the Palestinian authority meeting a number of conditions
relating to democratization and an end to violence and terrorism. As a result of
recent violence, the status of the Roadmap is uncertain.
Western Sahara. The U.N.-sponsored Baker Peace Plan for the resolution
of the Western Sahara conflict provides for the creation of self-governing
institutions under the auspices and with the assistance of the United Nations.40
The Baker Peace Plan calls for the devolution of numerous sovereign powers
and functions to the Western Sahara Authority, with a determination of the
final status by a referendum to be held within five years. As of the date of
publication, the Polisario Front has agreed to the plan, and it is awaiting the
approval of the Moroccan government.
III. EARNED SOVEREIGNTY: DEFINING THE ELEMENTS THROUGH
RECENT STATE PRACTICE
A. Shared Sovereignty
During the initial stage of shared sovereignty, a provisional framework
may be created within which states, substate entities, and international
organizations share sovereign authority and functions. If managed
constructively, shared sovereignty affords a cooling-off period during which
central authorities and aggrieved people can each continue to pledge fidelity to
their own, mutually incompatible final aims, while initially suspending
violence. The framework for shared sovereignty may vary according to the
duration of the sharing period, the substantive division of authority, the parties
involved, and the goals to be addressed.
While Serbia and Montenegro, Northern Ireland, Bougainville, and the
Western Sahara share sovereignty with a central authority, in the cases of
Kosovo and East Timor, the substate entity shares sovereign authority and
areas of Palestine is of particular importance. Since then, numerous outbreaks of violence have
occurred, and several attempts at peace have proven unsuccessful. The Oslo agreement initiated steps
towards greater Arab autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Arabs, led by the Palestinian
Liberation Organization, have largely abandoned their claim to the entire region, requesting instead
statehood in the occupied areas. See Nahda Y. Sh'hada, Gender and Politics in Palestine: Discourse
Analysis of the Palestinian Authority & Islamists, 11 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 3, 7 (2003).
40 Report of the Secretary General on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara, Annex It, at
14-18, U.N. Doc. S/2003/565 (May 23, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/Depts/
dpko/missions/minurso/reports.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Baker Plan]. Despite an
International Court of Justice ruling in 1973 that said self-determination in the area was of paramount
importance and a U.N. Commission which reported the vast majority of Sahrawis in the area
supported independence, Spain split their territory between Morocco and Mauritania in 1975. Since
1976, exiled Sahrawis known as the Polisario Front have fought with Morocco for self-determination
rights. Mauritania renounced its claim in 1978 after defeat by the Polisario. A ceasefire was signed in
1991, and a U.N. monitoring force has remained to administer the territory. Kofi Annan sent James
Baker as special envoy to the region to offer a new U.N.-brokered peace plan to bring about this
referendum. See generally Yahia H. Zoubir, The West Saharan Conflict: A Case Study in Failure of
Prenegotiation and Prolongation of Conflict, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 173 (1996).
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functions with international organizations during an interim period prior to a
determination of final status. The international community may exercise
certain sovereign authority and functions because the state has been precluded
from exercising those functions and the substate entity is not yet capable of
doing so. 41
Frequently, shared sovereignty may provide the substate entity with
substantial elements of self-government, so as to considerably lessen the
interest in outright independence and eliminate the causes of conflict through
some form of perpetual autonomy. This possibility seems to be the assumption
of Papua New Guinea and that of international mediators as reflected in the
Bougainville Agreement, which provides for a ten to fifteen-year period before
a referendum on independence. 42
The period of shared sovereignty may also be designed merely as a way
station to independence, with the substate entity exercising nearly all the power
and authority of an independent state43 and equally sharing any remaining
authority.44 In the case of the Union Treaty of Serbia and Montenegro, the
41 In the case of Kosovo, U.N. Resolution 1244 provided for the creation of the United Nations
Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK"), which initially assumed responsibility for nearly all of Kosovo's
sovereign authority and functions, leaving only a few functions to be exercised by the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY"). Over time, the UNMIK representative worked to create a Kosovo
Constitutional Framework providing for a parliament and a president. The U.N. representative then
embarked on a process of devolving specified powers to the Kosovo institutions and excluding the
exercise of any authority by FRY institutions. Moreover, internal and external security for Kosovo is
provided by a NATO-led force, and elections are conducted by the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE"). Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self Government, U.N.
Mission in Kosovo, May 15, 2001, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (2001), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/constframework.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
Constitutional Framework]; S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 35.
42 The Bougainville Agreement provides a very high degree of autonomy for Bougainville
through a complex set of power sharing and institutional arrangements that are constitutionally
guaranteed. The constitutional provisions establishing Bougainville's autonomy are protected from
unilateral changes by the Papua New Guinea Parliament since they can only be amended with the
consent of Bougainville. Bougainville's local government operates under a homegrown Bougainville
Constitution. Bougainville has the right to gradually acquire most powers and functions currently
within the competence of the Papua New Guinea Government, such as creating its own revenue
through taxes and establishing separate Bougainville courts, public service, and police. For a full list
of competencies related to devolution and autonomy, see Bougainville Agreement, supra note 31, § B,
arts. 1-15. See id. § B, art. 3, paras. 10-27 for specifics relating to the Bougainville Constitution.
43 The new constitution for the Union of Serbia and Montenegro creates an elaborate structure
of shared sovereignty between the member states of Montenegro and Serbia. Under the agreement,
the member states may maintain international relations, conclude international agreements, and
establish branch offices in other states, if it is not contrary to the competencies of the Union. The
member states may also assume membership in international and regional organizations that do not
require international subjectivity as a condition for their membership. The president of each member
state also sits on the Supreme Defense Council, which must act by consensus, thus providing each
member state with shared authority for the defense policy of the Union. See SERB. & MONT. CONST.,
supra note 29, art. 56. The Supreme Court, which comprises an equal number ofjudges from each of
the member states, must include judges from the Constitutional Courts of the member states whenever
it is hearing a case relating to the conformity of the legislation or competencies of the member states
with the legislation or competencies of the Union, or a case between the member states themselves.
Id. art. 49.
44 While the Union government does exercise some exclusive authority and function, they are
limited to matters such as immigration, selection of flag and anthem, and working with the European
Union on economic harmonization. All diplomatic representatives must be appointed with the consent
of the member states. To ensure the representation of the interests of the member states in the exercise
of even these limited functions, the constitution creates a complicated arrangement whereby of the
five cabinet positions two ministers shall be from the same member state as the President, and three
shall be from the other member state. Moreover, the Foreign Minister and the Minister of Defense
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Union exercises almost no original authority and merely serves as a conduit
between the member states and the international community, in particular the
European Union and the international financial institutions.4 5
However, the period of shared sovereignty is sometimes also intended to
build confidence and promote institutional reconciliation between the parties.
For instance, in Northern Ireland shared sovereignty has been considered
necessary for the state and substate entity to establish a viable relationship that
will survive the eventual independence or territorial reassociation of the
substate entity.46 The period of shared sovereignty in some cases may also be
used to normalize the unstable environment resulting from an armed conflict,
and to assist the substate entity in establishing the necessary institutions for
self-government.4 7
In other cases the power is more divided than shared. For instance in the
case of the Baker Peace Plan for the Western Sahara, numerous powers are to
be devolved to the Western Sahara Authority relating to taxation, economic
development, internal security, law enforcement, commerce, resource
development, and social welfare, while Morocco will retain authority over the
most basic sovereign functions, such as foreign relations.4 8
The time frame of shared sovereignty also differs in distinct circumstances.
In nearly all cases, the peace agreements or constitutions provide a specified
time period for shared sovereignty. The range extends from two years in East
Timor and three years for the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, to ten to fifteen
may not be from the same member state, and, upon the completion of a two-year period, (half their
term), certain ministers must exchange their functions with their deputies, who are from different
member states. Id. arts. 35, 42.
45 Id.
46 In the interim, the agreement provides for the devolution of certain sovereign authorities and
functions to Northern Ireland, while retrenching some of the jurisdictional power of the United
Kingdom and the claimed jurisdiction of Ireland. Specifically, it calls for the British government to
repeal the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, which reasserted British jurisdiction over all of Ireland,
and requires the Irish government to relinquish its constitutional claim to the Northern Province. The
Northern Ireland Assembly ("Assembly"), which is the first local legislative body in the territory's
history to have substantial, elected, cross-community representation, exercises significant legislative
and executive authority. The Assembly is entrusted with the responsibility of electing ministers with
department responsibilities (e.g., education and health) to carry out executive functions, except those
pertaining to areas such as security, justice, prisons, and policing, which remain with the central
government in the interim. Good Friday Agreement, supra note 30, § 2.
47 After the East Timorese rejected via referendum a proposal which would have provided for
autonomy within Indonesia, they came under supervision of the United Nations. In light of the violent
response by Indonesian military forces and paramilitary groups in East Timor, Indonesia was forced to
recognize East Timor's right to be independent. The United Nations replaced Indonesia as the
authority responsible for the management of sovereignty during the transition to full independence for
East Timor. During the period of shared sovereignty, U.N. officials headed the ministries of Internal
Security, Justice, Political Affairs, Constitutional and Electoral Affairs, and Finance, while East
Timorese headed the ministries of Internal Administration, Infrastructure, Economic Affairs, Foreign
Affairs, and Social Affairs. The National Consultative Council ("NCC") was chaired by the U.N.
Transitional Administrator and comprised of three U.N. officials and over a dozen East Timorese
appointed by the U.N. administrator. The National Consultative Council and Joint Sectoral
Committees were established on December 2, 1999 by the U.N. Transitional Administration in East
Timor ("UNTAET") and enacted by U.N. transitional administrator Sergio Vieira de Mello.
UNTAET, Reg. No. 1999/2, at § 1, 5 (1999), available at http://www.un.org/
peace/etimor/untaetR/etreg2.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
48 Baker Plan, supra note 40, § 3, para. 8b.
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years for Papua New Guinea and Bougainville.49
As a component of the earned sovereignty approach, shared sovereignty is
quite flexible, and is tailored to support the implementation of related
components. Thus, in some instances, the time frame is set at a specified
period of time, such as three years in Montenegro, while in other cases, such as
Kosovo, the time frame may be indefinite and subject to the fulfillment of
certain conditions, as opposed to specified timelines. Shared sovereignty also
lends itself to the establishment of markers and milestones that the emerging
entity must meet in order to move beyond the transition phase to final status.
This is an optional element called conditional sovereignty, which is discussed
below.
B. Institution Building
Because functioning democratic institutions are considered the most
effective guarantee to prevent renewed conflict in the long term, promoting the
development of democratic institutions has become an essential element of
modern peacebuilding. In the short term, institution building is intended to
create the capacity for the assumption of sovereign authority and the functions
necessary for the establishment of an autonomous entity, or a future
independent state. This process usually begins during the initial period of
shared sovereignty, and may be addressed by a range of domestic and
international actors.
The increasing role of the international community in erecting domestic
institutions in substate entities is reflective of the international community's
willingness to undertake global conflict management. As such, the
international community is no longer involved in the peace process as only a
diplomatic actor,50 but rather as a substantive participant, endorsing a variety
of tasks. These tasks include disarmament and demobilization, capacity
building, promotion and monitoring of elections, human rights monitoring and
transitional justice, refugee return, and the related settlement of land disputes.
In limited cases, such as East Timor and Kosovo, the international
community is called upon to create the foundation for nearly all political and
security institutions to allow the substate entity to effectively operate as an
independent state.5 1 This may even entail creating and appointing cabinet-
49 Other timeframes include four to five years for Western Sahara, six years for the Sudan, the
possibility of seven years in Northern Ireland, and a flexible three phase approach for Israel, with a
target of three years.
50 See generally GIOVANNI CELLAMMARE, LE OPERAZIONI DI PEACE-KEEPING
MULTIFUNZIONALI (1999) (noting the development of international peacekeeping operations over the
latter half of the twentieth century).
51 In East Timor, the Security Council authorized the United Nations to construct all the
necessary institutions to transition East Timor from a period of shared sovereignty with the United
Nations to one of independence. To implement the transition to self-governance, the Secretary
General appointed a Transitional Administrator for East Timor (the "Administrator") who also served
as the Special Representative to the Secretary General for East Timor. Although the Administrator
retained ultimate authority over the territory, he quickly moved to establish the National Consultative
Council ("NCC") comprised of fifteen individuals as a way to bring the East Timorese into the
decisionmaking process early on. The same regulation that created the NCC also created Joint
Sectoral Committees to be composed of East Timorese and international experts to provide advice in
the areas of agriculture, education, environment, health, human rights, infrastructure, local
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level posts, which may then be transformed into an interim governing
council. 52 In other cases, such as the Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap and the
Baker Peace Plan for Western Sahara, specific members of the international
community are called upon in a more limited capacity to create and monitor a
limited number of key institutions necessary for democratic development 53 and
the provision of security.54
In rare instances, the focus is on the creation of institutions that can assume
the transfer of administrative functions from the parent state, a process from
which the international community may be excluded. For example, in the case
of Northern Ireland, while there was no need to provide for the creation of new
administrative institutions, there was a need to create political institutions, and
to reform many of the key existing administrative institutions. The Good
Friday Agreement thus provided for the creation of the Northern Ireland
Assembly, which would be able to absorb the sovereign functions and
authority to be devolved from the United Kingdom.55 The Agreement also
provided for the creation of two consultative mechanisms, a North/South
Ministerial Council56 and a British-Irish Council, intended to facilitate political
stability during the period of shared sovereignty and the transfer of sovereign
administration, natural resources, finance, and macroeconomics. UNTAET, Reg. No. 1999/2, supra
note 47, § 5.
52 In July 2000, the Administrator created eight cabinet-level positions comprised of four
internationals and four East Timorese. Also in July, at the urging of East Timorese members of the
NCC, the Administrator transformed that body into a larger, all-Timorese National Council composed
of thirty-three members to serve as the nucleus of a future assembly. These two bodies provided the
skeletal framework for East Timor's first nascent government, the East Timor Transitional
Administration. United Nations, Office of the Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on
the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, U.N. Doc. S/2001/42 (2001), available
at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO1/213/1 1/IMG/NO121311 .pdf?OpenElement.
53 The Baker Peace Plan for the Western Sahara allows for the United Nations to assist with the
creation of a Western Sahara government that includes a Chief Executive, a Legislative Assembly, and
a Supreme Court. Elections for the Assembly and the Chief Executive are to be held by the United
Nations within one year of the adoption of the Baker Plan. Baker Plan, supra note 40, § 3, para. 15, §
4, para. 21.
54 The Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap provides that the United States, the United Nations, the
European Union, and Russia will assist the Palestinians in constructing a number of institutions
necessary for assuming greater attributes of sovereignty. In particular, the Roadmap provides for the
restructuring of security services, the establishment of an Interior Ministry, the appointment of an
interim prime minister or cabinet with executive decisionmaking capacity, the adoption of a
Palestinian constitution, and the creation of an electoral commission. A Performance-Based Roadmap
to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Apr. 30, 2003, available at
http://www.un.org/News/dh/mideast/roadmap122002.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2004) [hereinafter
Roadmap]. See also U.S. President George W. Bush, Address at the Rose Garden (June 24, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html (last visited Mar.
22, 2004) (announcing an intent to work towards development of this roadmap).
55 The Northern Ireland Assembly is a 108-member Assembly with executive and legislative
powers. In order to prevent gridlock or dominance by the two major voting blocs (those favoring
union with England and those favoring union with Ireland), the Good Friday Agreement requires that
"key decisions" taken by the Assembly receive cross-community support by a "weighted majority" or
"parallel consent." Good Friday Agreement, supra note 30, § 3, para. 5d.
56 The North/South Ministerial Council consists of members with executive authority in
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. The Good Friday Agreement required the Council to identify
at least twelve areas for future cooperation throughout the island, including six areas where new
implementation bodies will carry out joint responsibilities immediately. In late 1998, the Council
identified the latter as inland waterways, food safety, trade and business development, certain
European Union programs, language, and aquaculture and marine matters. The six other areas of
cooperation will include transport, agriculture, education, health, environment, and tourism. Id. § 4
(Strand 2), para. 8 (referencing the Annex for a list of these areas).
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functions and authority to Northern Ireland.57
Finally, the substate entity may also begin to create institutions of self-
government prior to the period of agreed shared sovereignty. For example, the
Montenegrin government, with support from the United States and the
European Union both prior to and after the signing of the Union Treaty,
established a Foreign Ministry with unofficial diplomatic offices abroad, a
Ministry of Finance, and a Central Bank.58
C. Determination of Final Status
At some point during the conflict resolution process it will be necessary to
determine the final status of the substate entity. The options for final status
range from substantial autonomy to full independence. This decision is
generally made through either some sort of referendum or in structrued
negotiations, but invariably involves the political consent of the international
community in the form of international recognition or support.
With certain exceptions, 59 the date for a referendum will be set to occur
after a period of shared sovereignty and institution building. The agreement
for the creation of a Union of Serbia and Montenegro, for example, provides
that, after three years, the republic may separate from the Union and become
independent via a referendum. 60 The Baker Peace Plan provides that the final
status of Western Sahara shall be determined by referendum no earlier than
four and no later than five years after the adoption of the Peace Plan.61 The
Machakos Protocol provides for an internationally monitored referendum after
six years by which the people of Southern Sudan may either confirm the unity
of the Sudan, by voting to adopt the system of government established under
the peace agreement, or vote for secession. 62 The Bougainville Agreement
provides for a referendum on the separation of Bougainville from Papua New
Guinea after ten and before fifteen years from the adoption of the agreement. 63
The Good Friday Agreement takes a more nuanced approach. The
Agreement provides that the British Secretary of State will call for a
referendum on independence in seven year intervals if it is "likely" that the
majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should
57 The British-Irish Council was created to deal with bilateral issues of mutual interest, with a
particular focus on sensitive matters of policing, security, justice, and prisons. The Good Friday
Agreement provides that those powers remain with the Secretary of State, but indicates that they could
one day be transferred to the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Council includes representatives from
the British government, the Irish government, the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland,
Scotland and Wales, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man. Id. § 5 (Strand 3), para. 2.
58 The Montenegrin government also adopted the Deutsch Mark, and subsequently the Euro, in
an effort to promote integration with European monetary institutions. Throughout this time, Serbia
continued to use the Yugoslav dinar.
59 Sometimes the final status is determined during the initial stages of the process, as in the case
of East Timor, where the rejection by referendum of the proposal for autonomy within Indonesia
initiated the process of earned sovereignty.
60 SERB. & MONT. CONST., supra note 29, art. 60.
61 Baker Plan, supra note 40, § 2, para. 2.
62 Machakos Protocol, supra note 36, pt. B, para. 2.5.
63 In the case of the Bougainville Agreement, the outcome of the referendum must, however, be
ratified by the parliament. Bougainville Agreement, supra note 31, § C, para. 312(a).
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cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland.64
The nature of final status may also be determined through a negotiated
settlement between the state and substate entity, often with international
mediation. When final status is to be determined by a negotiated settlement, it
may or may not involve a nonbinding referendum. In the Rambouillet
Accords, the final status of Kosovo was to be determined by an international
conference, which would consider the will of the people for independence. 65
As with the other elements of the earned sovereignty approach, the
determination of final status must be tailored to the particular nuances of the
situation on the ground. Thus, in another example, the Israeli-Palestinian
Roadmap provides that the final status of Palestine be determined in two
stages. The first stage will follow successful institution building and will
involve an international conference convened by the Quartet, at which the
parties will negotiate the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with
provisional borders. The second stage will involve a second conference at
which the parties will conclude a permanent status agreement encompassing
consensus on permanent borders, refugees, settlements, and the status of
Jerusalem. 66
D. Phased Sovereignty
Depending upon the nature and characteristics of the conflict, it may not
always be possible to achieve even preliminary power sharing arrangements.
Thus, to enhance the relationship between shared sovereignty and institution
building, some earned sovereignty agreements have incorporated the element
of phased sovereignty. Phased sovereignty involves the measured devolution
of sovereign functions and authority from the parent state or international
community to the substate entity during the period of shared sovereignty.
Phased sovereignty can be useful to promote a smooth transition in those
contexts where the adversarial claims of the parties do not allow for immediate
devolution of powers. The timing and extent of the devolution of authority and
functions may be correlated with the development of institutional capacity
and/or conditioned on the fulfillment of certain benchmarks, such as
democratic reform and the protection of human rights.
Kosovo presents the most comprehensive example of the use of phased
sovereignty to manage the devolution of sovereign authority and functions.
Subsequent to Resolution 1244, the United Nations endorsed a Provisional
Constitutional Framework for Kosovo, which provided that both the U.N.
Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK") and Kosovar entities would exercise most of
the functions typically associated with an independent state, including foreign
relations. 67 Since then, UNMIK has gradually transferred nearly all the local
64 If the resulting vote favors unification with Ireland, the Secretary of State is obligated to take
such measures as are necessary for the British Parliament to give effect to the referendum's result.
Good Friday Agreement, supra note 30, § 2, annex, nos. 1, 2.
65 Rambouillet Agreement, supra note 35, ch. 8, art. 1, para. 3.
66 Roadmap, supra note 54, §§ 5-6.
67 Constitutional Framework, supra note 41, ch. 1, art. 1. Initially nearly all the authority and
functions were designated "reserved competencies" that remained with UNMIK. Id.
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powers to Kosovar municipal authorities, and has begun a slow but steady
process of transferring power to Kosovo's central government institutions.
The degree of transfer is determined by an informal mix of institutional
capacity on the part of Kosovo, and the coordination of the timing of
devolution with progress being made towards resolving the final status of
Kosovo.68
Other agreements that include an element of phased sovereignty are the
Good Friday Agreement, the Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap, and the
Bougainville Agreement. In the Good Friday Agreement, the United Kingdom
is able to manage the rate of devolution, and even reverse the devolution by
suspending parliament, if the Irish Republican Army fails to comply with its
obligations to demobilize and decommission its weapons. 69 The Israeli-
Palestinian Roadmap provides for the phased accumulation of sovereign
attributes, beginning with the adoption of a new constitution and elections for a
prime minister and cabinet and ending with the possible creation of an
independent Palestinian state. 70 The Bougainville Agreement also provides
that the Bougainville Government will assume increased control over a wide
range of powers, functions, personnel, and resources during the interim period
prior to the determination of final status. 71
It is worth noting that not all instances of earned sovereignty require the
element of phased sovereignty. For example, upon ratification of the
agreement for the creation of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, both
member states immediately assumed the sovereign authority and functions
allocated to them under the agreement. In fact, Montenegro had exercised
many of those functions prior to the adoption of the agreement.
E. Conditional Sovereignty
To promote effective implementation of power sharing through
functioning democratic institutions, the transfer of sovereign authority to the
substate entity, or the determination of final status, may be conditioned upon
the fulfillment of certain benchmarks. Some peace agreements condition the
development of the process of earning sovereignty on the achievement of a
satisfactory level of good governance and legal guarantees. This includes
protection of human and minority rights, disarmament and demobilization,
development of democratic institutions, institution of the rule of law, and
promotion of regional stability.
The element of conditional sovereignty originated in the European
approach of earned recognition of the successor states of the former Soviet
Union and the former Yugoslavia. In response to calls for international
recognition by the republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, on December
16, 1991, the European Community Council of Foreign Ministers developed a
68 With respect to the latter factor, UNMIK is concerned that rapidly transferring powers to
Kosovo might prejudice the outcome of the final status talks since a complete assumption of these
powers would render Kosovo a de facto independent entity.
69 Good Friday Agreement, supra note 30, § 7.
70 Roadmap, supra note 54, at 34.
71 Bougainville Agreement, supra note 31, § 7.
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
policy of earned recognition. 72 Under this approach, states seeking recognition
by the European Community were required to meet a set of detailed criteria.
The European Community then adopted additional criteria to be applied
specifically to the republics of Yugoslavia, and required that the republics
seeking recognition submit an application to the Yugoslav Peace Conference
being conducted by the United Nations and European Union at that time. The
co-chairs of the Peace Conference would then seek a determination from the
Arbitration Commission as to whether the applicant states fulfilled the criteria
for recognition. 73
Within the approach of earned sovereignty, the conditions will necessarily
vary depending on the context of the conflict, and will particularly aim to
eradicate what is identified as the major obstacle to peace. For example, the
Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East is conditioned on the cessation of
terrorism. 74 In the case of Northern Ireland, the continued devolution of
authority was conditioned on the decommissioning of paramilitary forces and
the surrender of weapons.75 In Kosovo, the United Nations adopted an
approach of "standards before status," which provided that before Kosovo
could undertake final status negotiations to secure independence, it must meet
a number of standards or benchmarks, 76 with an emphasis on the protection of
human rights and the return of refugees. The Bougainville agreement provides
that the referendum on final status will only be held if the Bougainville
government ensures the decommissioning and disposal of weapons and
undertakes good governance, including the development of democracy,
transparency, and accountability, as well as respect for human rights and the
rule of law. 77  However, not all phased agreements contain the element of
72 Danilo Turk, Declaration on the "Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern
Europe and in the Soviet Union," 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 72, 72 (1993).
73 Id.
74 See Roadmap, supra note 54, §§ 2-3. Additionally, the Israeli-Palestine Roadmap conditions
the movement from phase two (the transition phase) to phase three (the final status phase) on the
completion of free and open elections in Palestine, the appointment of new cabinet officials, the
creation of a new constitution, reform of the Palestinian security forces, and the designation of
provisional borders. Id. § 5. Recently, President Bush has also emphasized that progress in rooting
out corruption would be explicitly linked to progress toward the establishment of a provisional
Palestinian state. See President George W. Bush, Speech at Whitehall Palace, London (Nov. 19,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html (last visited
Feb. 24, 2004).
75 See Good Friday Agreement, supra note 30, § 7.
76 Specifically, the benchmarks covered the areas of functioning democratic institutions, rule of
law, freedom of movement, refugee returns and reintegration, economic reform and development,
property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the responsible operation of the Kosovo Protection Corps.
U.N. MIssIoN IN Kosovo, STANDARDS BEFORE STATUS (May 2002), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/apr02/benchmarks eng.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2004)
[hereinafter STANDARDS BEFORE STATUS]; Press Release, United Nations, Highlights of the
Introductory Remarks at a Press Conference by Michael Steiner, Special Representative of the
Secretary-General in Kosovo (June 27, 2002), available at http://www.unog.ch/news2/
documents/newsen/pc02O627.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2004) [hereinafter Highlights]. For each of
these categories, UNMIK set forth goals, benchmarks, and specific actions to be taken by the local
community. For instance, with respect to freedom of movement, UNMIK set the goal that all
communities can circulate freely throughout Kosovo, including city centers, and use their own
language. The benchmark for measuring the attainment of this goal was the unrestricted movement by
minorities without reliance on military or police. The required local action included policy and
sustained action by local institutions to promote freedom of movement publicly and unprompted
condemnation of obstruction and violence by holders of public office. Id.
77 See Bougainville Agreement, supra note 31, § C, para. 312b.
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conditional sovereignty. For instance, the Baker Peace Plan for Western
Sahara and the Machakos Protocol in the Sudan set specific dates for the
devolution of sovereign authority and functions, as well as the determination of
final status without conditions. 78
Some authors have regarded conditional sovereignty coupled with shared
sovereignty, as in the case of Kosovo, as a new model of international
trusteeship, 79 since its most important characteristic is the establishment of an
interim international administration with political authority attributed to a
representative of the international community.80  Apart from the legal
classification, the most relevant aspect of the global conflict management trend
is that it may indicate the emergence of a binding new set of values perceived
as essential by states.81 The values shaping and inspiring the contemporary
commitments of the international community include ending ethnic violence,
stopping human rights atrocities, promoting democracy, and encouraging the
rule of law. Recent postconflict operations-like those in East Timor and
Kosovo-could be seen as a practical reflection of the endorsement by the
international community of such values. From a functional perspective, such
operations represent the effort of the international community to fulfill what is
perceived as a collective obligation to pursue peace and stability throughout
the world, even at the cost of overriding the traditional interpretation of
sovereignty.
F. Constrained Sovereignty
Because the emergence of new states may be destabilizing to the
immediate region, the sovereignty of the new state may sometimes be
constrained by the international community. The potential for destabilization
arises from the fact that the state, even after a lengthy period of institution
building, remains incapable of exercising effective authority, or because the
new state's existence in and of itself creates a destabilizing political dynamic.
Constrained sovereignty involves the imposition of continued limitations
on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state. Examples of such
constraints include prolonged international administrative and/or military
presence and limits on the right of the state to undertake territorial association
with other states.
In some cases, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, an independent state may be
forced to share sovereign authority and functions with an international
organization. The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the Bosnian
conflict with Serbia, in effect established a regime whereby the independent
78 Baker Plan, supra note 40, § 3; Machakos Protocol, supra note 36, pt. B, para. 2.2.
79 See generally RICHARD CAPLAN, A NEW TRUSTEESHIP? THE INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION OF WAR-TORN TERRITORIES (2002) (analyzing the emergence of neotrusteeships in
postconflict settings).
80 Both in the case of Kosovo and East Timor, the transitional administration was headed by the
Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, endowed with a wide executive
and legislative power over the concerned territories.
81 Paolo Picone, Interventi delle Nazioni Unite e Obblighi Erga Omnes, in INTERVENTI DELLE
NAZIONI UNITE E OBBLIGHI ERGA OMNES 517 (Paolo Picone ed., 1995) (arguing that recent practice
in global conflict management has provided the foundation for the emergence of a new customary
norm of international law).
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state of Bosnia was put in a de facto trustee relationship with the international
community. The Bosnian government shared functions with an international
High Representative from a Western European country and with a NATO-led
force to ensure security. 82  In this case, the international community
determined that constrained sovereignty was necessary to ensure the territorial
integrity of Bosnia. Without an international presence, the Republica Srpska
would have sought to secede.
East Timor also remains under a soft form of constrained sovereignty, as
the international community-in the form of the United Nations Mission of
Support for East Timor ("UNMISET"), a U.N. follow-up mission-provides
continued assistance in the areas of civilian administration, law and order
(police and development of a law enforcement agency), and military security
(maintaining internal and external security). 83
G. A Note on Monitoring the Implementation of Earned Sovereignty
Frequently during the process of earned sovereignty, a monitoring
mechanism is established to build confidence among the parties, to ensure
coordinated implementation of the agreement, to monitor compliance, and to
assist in the resolution of any disputes. Although not a substantive component
of the earned sovereignty approach, the establishment of credible monitoring
mechanisms can often be a critical procedural element in safeguarding the
legitimacy and effectiveness of the approach.
In the case of Bougainville, the parties created an intergovernmental
supervisory body charged with overseeing the implementation of the
agreement and establishing the new Autonomous Bougainville Government. 84
The Machakos Protocol for the Sudan provides for the creation of an
Assessment and Evaluation Commission to monitor the implementation of the
peace agreement and conduct a midterm evaluation of the unity arrangements
established under the peace agreement. 85 The Baker Peace Plan for Western
Sahara provides for U.N. monitoring and for the right of the Secretary General
to issue binding interpretations regarding any disputes that may arise with
82 The international civilian presence now numbers close to eight thousand. In fact, the Office
of the High Representative has served as a de facto central governing authority in Bosnia since late
1995, with the power to veto and promulgate legislation and remove officials at any level of
government from municipal to provincial to state. A U.N. office oversees police and refugee matters,
and for the first several years after the agreement was signed, elections were handled by the OSCE.
See Dayton Agreement, supra note 33, Annex IA, art. I. For an analysis of recent experience in
international administration of postconflict areas, see generally CAPLAN, supra note 79.
83 Press Release, United Nations, Security Council Establishes Support Mission in East Timor,
Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1410, U.N. SCOR, 4534th mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/7400 (2002),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7400.doc.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
The administrative elements were scheduled to continue through the beginning of 2004, while
continued military assistance and training would continue until the second battalion of the new East
Timor Defense Force became operational (at least through 2003). Although independent, East Timor
will continue to rely heavily on the United Nations and donor countries as it continues to progress
toward ever-increasing levels of sovereignty. Id.
84 The same body was also granted competency to resolve disputes between the new
Bougainville government and Papua New Guinea. Bougainville Agreement, supra note 31, § 11,
paras. 263-64.
85 The Commission is to be comprised of representatives of the parties as well as representatives
from neighboring states and from the observer states of Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Machakos Protocol, supra note 36, § B, paras. 2.4, 2.4.1, 2.4.2.
40:347
2004 Earned Sovereignty
respect to the implementation of the Plan.86 In the case of Northern Ireland,
the parties have created a specialized Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission, the membership of which must reflect a community balance. 87
In many instances the parties decide that the objectives of a monitoring
mechanism are best met when the monitors are international. When this
happens, the monitoring mechanism might be the United Nations, a regional
body such as the African Union, European Union, or the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE"), an ad hoc group of nations, or
a combination of the above. In some cases, domestic monitoring mechanisms
may be combined with international mechanisms. 88
The Dayton Accords provided for extensive participation of international
organizations in the implementation of the Bosnian peace settlement. In the
military arena, the NATO-led security forces assisted in implementing the
terms of the agreements regarding territory, size and disposition of forces, and
in the establishment of a durable peace. 89 The agreement tasked the OSCE
with carrying out an election program for Bosnia.90 Similarly, in Kosovo and
East Timor, substantial numbers of international civilian administrators were
deployed to manage the sharing of sovereign authority and functions, while the
Israeli-Palestinian Roadmap provided for extensive monitoring operations by
members of the Quartet. 91
IV. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF EARNED SOVEREIGNTY:
THE CASE OF KOSOVO
This Part tracks and analyzes the application of the approach of earned
sovereignty to the crisis in Kosovo. The purpose of this discussion is to
provide insight into the way in which earned sovereignty might serve as a
bridge between the "sovereignty first" and "self-determination first"
approaches to conflict resolution. Moreover, the Kosovo crisis provides a
useful case study to examine how the political debate shapes the precise
86 Baker Plan, supra note 40, § 4, para. 22.
87 The Commission is designed to advise on the adequacy and enforcement of human rights
protections, to propose recommendations, to consider draft legislation, to instigate court proceedings,
and to otherwise ensure that the human rights commitments under the agreement are met. Good
Friday Agreement, supra note 30, § 6, para. 5.
88 For example, in Papua New Guinea, the domestic mechanisms are augmented by an
international Truce Monitoring Group and the presence of a U.N. Political Office for Bougainville.
U.N. POLITICAL OFFICE IN BOUGAINVILLE: BACKGROUND, available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev dip/asia_pacific/bougainville/fr bougainville background_3.htm
(last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
89 Dayton Agreement, supra note 33, annex 1A, art. I.
90 Id. annex 3, art. 2. The Dayton Accords also required the parties to grant access to the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the U.N.
Development Program, all of which thereby have acknowledged roles in the implementation of the
settlement. Finally, an International Police Task Force, under the auspices of the United Nations, was
established to train and monitor law enforcement personnel and their activities. Id., annex 11.
91 Roadmap, supra note 54, at 3.
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contours of the earned sovereignty approach and how it may be adopted to
incorporate the specific circumstances of a particular conflict. 92
The initial approach by the international community to the conflict in
Kosovo reflected its earlier approach to the Bosnian conflict-that of
accommodation and appeasement.93  Guided by the "sovereignty first"
approach, the international community sought to accommodate, and at times
appease, the Milosevic regime,94 as it sought to resolve the conflict by
providing for some degree of autonomy for Kosovo within the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia 95 ("FRY").96 Milosevic, invoking the claim of
sovereignty, relied upon military force to terrorize the civilian population in
order to keep Kosovo within the former Yugoslavia. Eventually, Milosevic
sought to simply expel the two million Albanian residents of Kosovo.
Conversely, the Kosovars invoked the principle of self-determination, held a
referendum on independence, and sought a negotiated outcome, while also
pursuing armed resistance. 97
The gridlock created by the hardened positions of the parties and
ineffective international intervention led to increasingly violent crimes against
civilians by Serbian forces, strained the credibility of NATO, nearly destroyed
the credibility of the European Union, and substantially increased the levels of
support for Kosovar armed resistance. 98  Within this context, earned
sovereignty was put forward as a means to bridge the competing interests of
sovereignty and self-determination and to provide a focal point for the
development of a more effective international approach. The approach was not
immediately accepted by the parties or by the international community as the
92 For a history of the conflict in Kosovo, see WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR:
BOSNIA, KOSOVO, AND THE FUTURE OF COMBAT 68 (2001); Ivo H. DAALDER & MICHAEL E.
O'HANLON, WINNING UGLY 28 (2000). For a more general history of Kosovo, see generally NOEL
MALCOLM, A SHORT HISTORY OF Kosovo (1998).
93 For a review of the European approach to the conflict in Bosnia, see generally MARK
ALMOND, EUROPE'S BACKYARD WAR: THE WAR IN THE BALKANS (1994); JANE M.O. SHARP,
BANKRUPT IN THE BALKANS: BRITISH POLICY IN BOSNIA (1993); JANE SHARP, HONEST BROKER OR
PERFIDIOUS ALBION? BRITISH POLICY IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1997); BRENDAN SIMMS,
UNF1NEST HOUR: BRITAIN AND THE DESTRUCTION OF BOSNIA (2001); DANIEL VERNET & JEAN-
MARC GONIN, GUERRE DANS LES BALKANS: LE MIROIR BRISt YOUGOSLAVE (1994); Olivier Lepick,
French Perspectives, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT 76 (Alex
Danchev & Thomas Halverson eds., 1996). For a review of the American approach, see generally
WARREN ZIMMERMANN, ORIGINS OF A CATASTROPHE: YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS DESTROYERS-
AMERICA'S LAST AMBASSADOR TELLS WHAT HAPPENED AND WHY (1996).
94 Interview with Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State, PBS Frontline: The War in Europe,
at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/albright.html (last visited Mar.
12, 2004) [hereinafter Albright Interview].
95 On February 4, 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia officially changed its name to
Serbia and Montenegro. See Vesna Peric Zimonjic, Politics-Yugoslavia: A Country Disappears,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 4, 2003. For purposes of clarity, however, the former name will be used
in this Article.
96 See Press Release, Contact Group Foreign Ministers, Statement on Kosovo (Sep. 24, 1997),
available at http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/contact-g/default.asp?content-id=3543 (last visited Mar. 8,
2004); Press Release, Contact Group Foreign Ministers, Statement on Kosovo (Jan. 8, 1998),
available at http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/contact-g/default.asp?contentid=3547 (last visited Mar. 19,
2004).
97 WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra note 25, at 57-61.
98 See generally Paul R. Williams & Karina M. Waller, Coercive Appeasement: The Flawed
International Response to the Serbian Rogue Regime, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 825 (2002) (assessing the
American and European approach to resolving the Kosovo conflict).
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preferred approach to resolving the conflict. Rather, it competed with the other
primary approaches and only gradually emerged as the approach of choice,
though in a modified form.
A. Earned Sovereignty-An Initial Proposal
Throughout the summer of 1998, the United States and European Union,
guided by the sovereignty first approach, undertook shuttle diplomacy between
Serbia and Kosovo, seeking to craft a regime of heightened autonomy for
Kosovo within the former Yugoslavia. In response to the failure of these
efforts, and increasing violence, the Public International Law & Policy Group
("PILPG") put forward a proposal for earned sovereignty.99 The key elements
of the 1998 PILPG approach involved the creation of a process whereby the
people of Kosovo, through legitimate political bodies, would be entitled to
exercise certain sovereign rights, while simultaneously retaining specified links
to the FRY, thereby sharing sovereignty.100 As a condition for attaining
greater sovereign authority and functions, the people of Kosovo and their
political institutions would be required to: (1) guarantee the protection of the
rights of all minority populations within Kosovo; (2) respect the territorial
integrity of neighboring states such as Macedonia and Albania; (3) renounce
any intention of political or territorial association with Albania; and (4) accept
Kosovo's borders as confirmed by the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. After a
three to five-year transitional period, the final status of Kosovo would be
determined via an internationally conducted referendum within Kosovo.101
Once Kosovo earned international recognition, its sovereignty would be
constrained by obligations to protect minority rights, maintain its current
borders, and reject any political or territorial association with Albania. 102
The rationale for the 1998 PILPG proposal was based on the assumption
that the people of Kosovo had, to a certain degree, earned a right to increased
sovereignty because of the long history of human rights violations perpetrated
against them by the Serbian regime.103 Given the circumstances of their
99 While the concept of earned sovereignty was originally articulated as "intermediate
sovereignty," and subsequently referred to as "conditional independence," the most descriptive
reference to the concept is "earned sovereignty." See PUB. INT'L LAW & POL'Y GROUP,
INTERMEDIATE SOVEREIGNTY AS A BASIS FOR RESOLVING THE KOSOVO CRISIS, at i (1997), available
at http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm?id=1596&l=1 (last visited Mar. 20, 2004) [hereinafter
INTERMEDIATE SOVEREIGNTY]. This memorandum was developed by the PILPG in conjunction with
a working group composed of former U.S. Department of State lawyers and pro bono counsel from the
Washington, D.C. law firm Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering.
100 INTERMEDIATE SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 99, at i.
101 Id. at 38.
102 Id.
103 The PILPG memorandum argued that the legal basis underlying the earned sovereignty
approach for Kosovo was the principle of self-determination in international law, which provided that
all self-identified groups with a coherent identity and connection to a defined territory are entitled to
collectively determine their political destiny in a democratic fashion, and to be free from systematic
persecution. Additionally, in cases where self-identified groups are effectively denied their right to
democratic self-government and are consequently subjected to gross violations of their human rights,
the most reasonable course of action is for the international community to support international status
for the substate entity in order to ensure the protection of those rights. Id. at ii.
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situation, it appeared that the only means for adequately protecting those rights
would be some form of international status for Kosovo.104
Despite Kosovo's perceived right to independence, it was necessary to
ensure that Kosovo's attainment of international status did not have negative
consequences in the region or lead to additional violations of human rights.
Therefore, the proposal included a process whereby the international
community could manage the emergence of an independent Kosovo in such a
way as to ensure regional stability. The corollary element was that the
Kosovars-while entitled to some degree of sovereignty because of past
abuses by the Serbian regime-would be required to earn full sovereignty at
the end of an interim period by demonstrating their commitment to democratic
self-government, the protection of human rights, and the promotion of regional
security. While not explicitly stated in the 1998 PILPG memorandum, the
proposal provided support for the notion that certain specified limits on
sovereignty might continue after Kosovo had attained international
recognition.105
The proposal for earned sovereignty was initially greeted with skepticism:
It seemed to provide for the devolution of too much sovereign authority. There
was also concern that the prospect of an independent Kosovo, no matter how
intensively managed by the international community, might destabilize the
region by providing an impetus for a greater Albania consisting of Kosovo,
Albania, and part of Macedonia. This latter concern would influence the
development of the earned sovereignty approach throughout the conflict.
B. Adopting the Earned Sovereignty Approach
Within two months of the release of the report, the failure of current
diplomatic efforts and the necessity of a new approach became apparent when
Serbian security forces massacred over forty civilians in the Kosovo village of
Racak. 106 The head of the unarmed international monitoring team in Kosovo,
Ambassador William Walker, publicly declared the massacre to be a crime
against humanity.' 07 Public reaction in the United States and Europe to the
104 The 1998 PILPG proposal also drew legal support from several factors. First, the legal and
factual similarity between Kosovo and the other republics of the former Yugoslavia were deemed by
the international community to be entitled to international recognition. Id. at 28-29. Secondly, the
element of conditional sovereignty had already been employed by the international community in
recognizing Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia after they met specific conditions,
forming a precedent of earned recognition. Id. at 29-32. Additionally, from a legal point of view,
Yugoslavian sovereignty had already been discarded with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the
international community had rejected Serbia/Montenegro's claim to continue its international legal
personality. Id. at 33-35. Moreover, the historical fact that Kosovo-while legitimately part of
Yugoslavia had never been legitimately incorporated into Serbia strengthened the argument in favor
of earned sovereignty for Kosovo. Id. at 33. Finally, at the time the recent precedent set by the
Russian/Chechen Accords and the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement provided a favorable trend to
support the earned sovereignty approach for Kosovo. Id. at 36-38.
105 See generally id. (suggesting that, once recognized by the international community, Kosovo
would remain bound by prior commitments, such as protecting the rights of all minority populations
within its territory, respecting the territorial integrity of Macedonia and Albania, rejecting any political
or territorial association with Albania, and maintaining the status of its borders).
106 See R. Jeffrey Smith, Serbs Tried to Cover Up Massacre; Kosovo Reprisal Plot Bared by
Phone Taps, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1999, at Al.
107 BBC News Online, Racak Killings: "Crime Against Humanity" (Mar. 17, 1999), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/298131.stm (last visited Mar. 12 2004). See also HUMAN RIGHTS
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massacre forced key American foreign policymakers to push for the convening
of peace negotiations backed by the threat of the use of force.108 The massacre
also added greater legitimacy to Kosovar claims for independence.
During the course of the Rambouillet/Paris negotiations, the Serbian
delegation sought a document which would grant them the authority to
exercise absolute control over Kosovo political institutions and maintain a
security presence.109 The American and European negotiators sought to create
a regime of shared sovereignty, with some international involvement in
providing security. Seeing an opportunity to move forward, the Kosovar
delegationI10 proposed an approach of earned sovereignty.
The intense involvement of the U.S. delegation, coupled with the moral
authority held by the Kosovar delegation as victims of crimes against
humanity, led to a draft agreement, known as the Rambouillet Accords, which
drew heavily on the approach of earned sovereignty.IlI The Accords provided
for shared sovereignty among the FRY, Kosovo, and the international
community. The FRY would be limited to exercising only the most essential
sovereign functions1 2 and would be required to withdraw nearly all its security
forces.'1 3 Kosovo would accumulate a number of sovereign functions1 4 and
establish institutions to effectively administer these functions. 115  The
international community would then provide security and aid Kosovo in
exercising its sovereign functions."16  The Accords also envisioned the
international community assisting Kosovo with the creation of necessary
institutions.
WATCH, YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT WAR CRIMES IN RACAK (1999), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/ 1999/jan/yugoO29.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
108 Radio Netherlands, Walker: "Racak Massacre Was Not Faked, " (Jun. 14, 2002), at
http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/icty02O613.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2004).
109 See Marc Weller, The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo, 75 INT'L AFF. 211, 233 (1999)
(providing an inside account of the Rambouillet negotiations).
110 The delegation now included one of the authors of the PILPG memorandum, and of this
Article, on its delegation as a legal advisor.
111 Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Feb.
23, 1999, U.N. Doc. S/1999/648 (Jun. 7, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/peace/
kosovo/99648 l.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Rambouillet Accords].
112 Under the Rambouillet Accords, the FRY institutions would be entitled to ensure the
territorial integrity of the FRY, maintain a common market, operate the customs services, establish
monetary policy, provide for defense, and conduct foreign policy. Id. ch. 1, art. 1(3).
113 The Accords provided for the complete withdrawal of all Yugoslav Army forces and the
substantial reduction of Serbian police forces in Kosovo, as well as the transformation of the Kosovo
Liberation Army into the Kosovo Protection Corps modeled after the American National Guard.
Security was to be provided by the deployment of an extensive international force. The international
force would be responsible for providing both internal and external security. Id. art. 2(2).
114 The Constitution provided for a full range of powers to be exercised by the Kosovo
government, including taxation, economic regulation and development, property rights, social policy,
environmental protection, local self-government, and the power to conduct foreign relations in
specified areas. Id. ch. 1, arts. 2-4.
115 The Rambouillet Accords sought to promote Kosovar democratic self-government by
creating a comprehensive constitution under the authority of which there would be the democratic
election of a President and an Assembly and the subsequent appointment of a prime minister and
government. Id.
116 For instance, three international judges were to sit on the Kosovar Supreme Court. Id. ch. 1,
art. 5(9).
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The Rambouillet Accords set forth a process for determining final status.
Pursuant to the Accords, three years after the agreement entered into force, an
international meeting would be convened to determine a mechanism for a final
settlement for Kosovo.117 Invoking the notion of conditional sovereignty, the
mechanism was to take into consideration, among other criteria, whether the
Kosovar Albanians had fulfilled obligations to establish democratic institutions
and to protect human and minority rights.'18 An assessment of the will of the
people, presumably through a referendum, would also guide the decision on
final status.
The draft Accords were agreed to by the Kosovar Albanians, but rejected
by Slobodan Milosevic, then President of Yugoslavia, who sought to resolve
the competition over sovereignty by ethnically cleansing Kosovo of its
Albanian population. Milosevic, along with the two co-chairmen of the
Serbian delegation to Rambouillet, was subsequently indicted and prosecuted
by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia for the crimes
committed by Serbian forces in Kosovo.119 To stop the campaign of ethnic
aggression, NATO launched an air campaign that was lifted only120 when
Milosevic agreed to transfer de facto sovereign control over Kosovo to the
United Nations and NATO.
The requirement for a strong U.N. role in institution building was
necessitated by the fact that, during the NATO air campaign, Milosevic had
expelled over 1.2 million Kosovars and had destroyed nearly all the existing
public institutions. 121  Thus, to provide a framework for the interim
administration of Kosovo by the United Nations, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 1244.122 While retaining the core elements of the earned
sovereignty approach reflected in the Rambouillet Accords, Resolution 1244
gave a primary role to the U.N. mission in overseeing the development of
democratic institutions (an added and now necessary element to the approach
of earned sovereignty). 123 The United Nations was then to devolve sovereign
authority and functions to these new institutions and to facilitate a political
process designed to determine Kosovo's future status based on the process
described in the Rambouillet Accords.
117 Id. ch. 8, art. 1(3)
118 To prevent future atrocities against the Kosovar Albanians, and to protect the Serbs from
acts of retribution, the Accords included numerous provisions on the protection of human rights. The
cornerstone of the protections for human rights was the incorporation of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and its Protocols, directly into Kosovar
law. Id. ch. 1, art. 6(2). Additional protections included the creation of an Ombudsman office with
extensive authority to monitor the protection of minority and human rights and fundamental freedoms
throughout Kosovo. Id. ch. 6, art. 1. The Accords also provided explicit protection for such rights as
the use of national community symbols, language, cultural and religious association, and the right to
be free from discrimination. Id. ch. 1, art. 7. To ensure the participation of minority representatives in
the government, the Accords established a quota system for such representatives in the Assembly and
for the adequate inclusion of minority representatives in government positions. Id. ch. 1, arts. 2-4.
119 For the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's indictment detailing
Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign, see The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Milosevic et al., 2002
I.C.T.Y IT-99-37 (July 19).
120 See Radio Netherlands, supra note 108.
121 WILLIAMS & SCHARF, supra note 25, at 57-61.
122 See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 35.
123 Id. para. 10.
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The substance of Resolution 1244 focused on: (1) displacing FRY
sovereignty from Kosovo;124 (2) replacing it with interim United Nations and
NATO sovereign responsibilities; 125 (3) establishing substantial autonomy and
democratic self-governance for the people of Kosovo;126 (4) "facilitating a
political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into
account the Rambouillet accords,"1 27 and (5) preparing in the final stage to
oversee "the transfer of authority from Kosovo's provisional institutions to
institutions established under a political settlement." 128  To carry out the
responsibility of reconstructing the political institutions of Kosovo, the U.N.
Secretary General created the UNMIK and appointed a Special Representative
of the Secretary General ("SRSG").129 UNMIK, under the SRSG, displaced
the FRY's ability to exercise sovereign authority and functions in Kosovo and
began the process of building Kosovar institutions.
Resolution 1244 essentially followed the basic themes of earned
sovereignty articulated in the 1998 proposal and the Rambouillet Accords: It
displaced Yugoslav sovereignty, created mechanisms for establishing
democratic self-government and the protection of minority rights, and
mandated the resolution of Kosovo's final status.
Resolution 1244, however, created a substantial addition to the earned
sovereignty approach by providing for the exercise of sovereign functions by
the United Nations.130 The original articulation of the approach and its design
in the Rambouillet Accords provided for a transfer of sovereignty to the people
of Kosovo and an evaluation of the final status of Kosovo based in part on its
compliance with the specific provisions of the Accords. Resolution 1244
provided that the United Nations initially would assume control of sovereign
functions and negotiate a constitutional framework, and then begin the transfer
of sovereign functions to Kosovar institutions. Simultaneously, the United
Nations was mandated to pursue a resolution of the final status of Kosovo. 131
However, despite a robust mandate, the United Nations made sluggish
progress, and hesitated in transferring substantial sovereign responsibility to
the Kosovars. The failure of the United Nations to effectively erect Kosovar
political institutions, and to transfer authority to those institutions while
pursuing the resolution of Kosovo's final status, was influenced by a number
of related factors. The inertia of an eight thousand-strong U.N. bureaucracy,
combined with substantial U.N. institutional corruption and a relative lack of
necessary competence in certain key areas, simply slowed any efforts to
transfer control to the Kosovar institutions. Moreover, the necessity of holding
municipal and Kosovo-wide elections delayed the opportunity for creating
effective Kosovar institutions.
124 Id. paras. 3, 4, 9.
125 Id. paras. 5-11, 17-19.
126 Id. para. 1 (a).
127 Id. para. 11(e).
128 Id. para. 11(f).
129 Id. paras. 6-11.
130 Id. para. 5, 6, 9-11.
131 Id. para. 11 (a).
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The relative disengagement of the United States after the air campaign and
the resumption of a leadership role by the European Union also presented the
European Union with an opportunity to scale back the approach of earned
sovereignty and return to a more comfortable approach, guided by its interest
in resisting the creation of new states. While the European Union was morally
precluded from arguing for a return of sovereignty to Serbia, it was able to
argue for a halt to the transfer of sovereignty to Kosovo-in part based on the
fact that some armed Kosovars had undertaken acts of retribution against
Serbian civilians in Kosovo immediately after the NATO humanitarian
intervention.
This lack of coordination on the part of the international community,
particularly the hesitation on the part of the United Nations to transfer
authority to the Kosovars and undertake a process for determining final status
as required by Resolution 1244 effectively derailed the approach of earned
sovereignty, leaving Kosovo with an undefined and stagnant status.
C. Reviving the Earned Sovereignty Approach
In response to the perceived failure of the United Nations to articulate a
clear plan for transferring sovereign authority and functions to Kosovo as
required under Resolution 1244, the Swedish government supported the
creation of an international commission (the "Commission") under the
chairmanship of Richard Goldstone, the former Chief Prosecutor for the
Yugoslav Tribunal and member of the South African Supreme Court. The
Commission undertook a series of international meetings and consultations
with the major international policymakers and interested constituencies. The
Commission then crafted a report calling for the revival of earned sovereignty,
in the form of conditional independence, for the people of Kosovo (the
"Goldstone Proposal" or "Proposal"). 132
The key elements of the Goldstone Proposal included a referendum to
ascertain the will of the people, U.N.-sponsored talks between the Kosovar
Albanians and the Kosovar Serbs, mechanisms to protect minority and human
rights, arrangements for the continued presence of international security forces,
and phased sovereignty in the form of the steady transfer of effective
administration from the United Nations to Kosovar institutions.1 33  The
Proposal emphasized the element of phased sovereignty, arguing that Kosovo
should be able to assume sovereign authority in proportion to the Kosovar
institutions' ability to provide internal and external security. 134
In response to the Goldstone Proposal and efforts by influential former
policymakers, the United States began to reengage, arguing for the necessity of
crafting province-wide institutions capable of absorbing the transfer of
sovereign authority from the United Nations to the people of Kosovo. These
132 INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT:
CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 284 (2000), available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/thekosovoreport.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2002)
[hereinafter THE KosovO REPORT].
133 See generally id.
134 Id. at 274.
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efforts met stiff resistance by the European Union and some European states,
who had come to believe that an independent Kosovo might further destabilize
the region and promote increased separatism in Europe.
As a result of the American pressure, the Europeans agreed to join in a
project for drafting a framework for provisional self-government (the
"Constitutional Framework"). The Constitutional Framework, which was
promulgated by the United Nations with little input from the Kosovar political
leadership, 135 provided for the development of a unique dual key system to
allocate governing responsibility between the SRSG authority and Kosovar
institutions. 136 With the adoption of the Constitutional Framework, Kosovo
entered a period of shared sovereignty between the United Nations and the
Kosovar political institutions.
D. A Change in Political Circumstances and the Retrenchment
of Earned Sovereignty
As the international community moved back onto the path of earned
sovereignty for Kosovo, a number of changes occurred within Serbia itself that
rejuvenated the E.U. claims for delaying the transfer of sovereignty from the
United Nations to Kosovo. With the collapse of Milosevic's authoritarian,
nationalist rule and its replacement with a more Western-focused government,
the European Union became increasingly concerned that efforts to increase
Kosovar self-governance could destabilize Serbia. The election of a pro-
independence government in Montenegro also dampened the willingness of the
European Union to support further devolution of sovereign authority and
135 See generally On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, U.N. Reg.
2001/9, U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2001/9
(2001), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg09-01.htm (last visited Mar. 11,
2003). The Constitutional Framework set forth three sets of guiding principles for the future
governance of Kosovo. First, it required the domestic institutions of Kosovo to "exercise their
authorities consistent with the provisions of Security Counsel Resolution 1244 and the terms set forth
in this Constitutional Framework." Id. ch. 2, para. a. Second, it required those institutions to
"promote and fully respect the rule of law, human rights and freedoms, democratic principles and
reconciliation." Id. ch. 2, para. b. To ensure the protection of human rights throughout Kosovo, the
Constitutional Framework required that the provisions on rights and freedoms set forth in a number of
international human rights treaties and instruments would be directly applicable in Kosovo as part of
the Constitutional Framework. Id. ch. 3, para. 2. Finally, the Constitutional Framework provided that
the Kosovar institutions must "promote and respect the principle of the division of powers between the
legislature, the executive and the judiciary." Id. ch. 2, para. c. These principles represent an
expansion of the core themes of earned sovereignty relating to the protection of human rights and the
basic principles of democratic governance.
The Constitutional Framework then enumerated the responsibilities of the provisional
institutions. These include economic policy, trade, administrative and operational customs, education,
health, environmental policy, infrastructure, agriculture and forestry, tourism, and "good governance,
human rights and equal opportunity." Id. ch. 5, para. 1. The institutions also possess specific duties in
the fields of local administration, judicial affairs, mass media, and emergency preparedness. The
Constitutional Framework further stipulated that any external relations conducted by the provisional
institutions must be conducted with the coordination of the SRSG, and that the powers must be
exercised in alignment with international standards. Id. ch. 5.
136 With respect to the allocation of authority, the Constitutional Framework set the foundation
for the implementation of a process of phased sovereignty, as suggested in the Goldstone Report, by
creating democratic institutions for the governance of Kosovo, while initially retaining most of the
authority for decisionmaking within the purview of the SRSG. The Constitutional Framework was
clear that, consistent with Resolution 1244, the powers retained by the SRSG should be increasingly
turned over to the people of Kosovo as the new institutions mature and become effective. Id. chs. 6,
14.2.
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functions to Kosovo. Moreover, although the Serbian public became
increasingly aware of the atrocities committed by Serbian forces against
Kosovar civilians, there was no abatement in the nationalist pull to retain
Kosovo within Serbia. Growing political violence in southern Serbia and
Macedonia reinforced the Serbian desire to retain Kosovo and the fear of the
European Union and the United States that an increasingly sovereign Kosovo
could lead to greater instability in the Balkan region. 137
The Goldstone Commission was concerned that the increasing willingness
of some E.U. and U.N. officials to treat Kosovar capacity for self-rule with
"imperial condescension" and "pervasive distrust" 38 would create a situation
where the Kosovar authorities would have little or no incentive to behave in a
responsible manner toward neighboring states.139 The Goldstone Commission
argued that an indefinite protectorate would not, as some claimed, allay tension
in the region by ruling out independence. Rather, the protectorate would
increase tension between the people of Kosovo and the U.N. administrators.
Moreover, by maintaining the undefined nature of Kosovo's status, the
international protectorate model would encourage both nationalist hopes for a
greater Albania-or for a greater Yugoslavia-and was in fact already serving
as a catalyst for ethnic violence, both within and outside Kosovo.
In light of the dangers posed by a halt to the process of earned sovereignty
for Kosovo, the Goldstone Commission issued a second, more detailed,
proposal for conditional independence.1 40 The basic elements of the proposal
included the rapid devolution of authority to Kosovar institutions, 141 and
substantial limiting of SRSG authority to include only protecting minorities,
guaranteeing of human rights, and guaranteeing border integrity. The SRSG
powers were to be exercised only when the locally elected officials failed to
meet their obligations. The Goldstone Commission again emphasized the
desirability of phased sovereignty, arguing that the presence of the
international community should be diminished and the sovereign authority of
Kosovo should continue to grow as the government and people of Kosovo
proved themselves capable of meeting the above commitments.142  The
137 The primary policy objective of the European Union in 2002 was to maintain the existence
of the Yugoslav federation in the face of Montenegrin desire for independence and growing
indifference on the part of Serbians toward the future of Yugoslavia. Believing that Kosovo's exit
would be guaranteed if Montenegro were to depart Yugoslavia, the European Union secured an
agreement that preserved Yugoslavia in a very loose confederacy for another three years before
referendums on independence, if so desired, could be launched. Maintaining the stability through
accommodation is the core of the European Union's Balkan policy in preserving Yugoslavia and in
avoiding determination of Kosovo's future political status.
138 THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 132, at 20-21.
139 Id. at 26.
140 See generally INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE FOLLOW-UP
OF THE KOSOVO REPORT: WHY CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE? (2001).
141 The Goldstone Commission argued for the rapid devolution of important powers from the
SRSG to the Kosovar government, relating to such matters as customs, the judiciary, the police, public
and state owned property, transportation, civil aviation, housing and property matters, and regulation
of municipal boundaries. On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, supra
note 135, at 25. The Goldstone Commission also argued that the undefined residual powers of
Chapter 12 of the Constitutional Framework should also be exercised by the Kosovar government. Id.
142 Coupled with the devolution of power, the Goldstone Commission proposed that the
relevant Kosovar institutions be permitted to negotiate with the NATO-led Kosovo Force ("KFOR")
international security presence in Kosovo, and that they be empowered to enter into negotiations with
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Goldstone Commission concluded that when Kosovo was fully able to meet
these commitments, the international community should recognize it as an
independent state. The Goldstone Commission also reintroduced the element
of constrained sovereignty found in the original PILPG memorandum.143
The second Goldstone Proposal also sought to rebut the three main
arguments presented by the European Union against moving forward with the
earned sovereignty approach. First, the Goldstone Commission addressed the
concern that the nascent democracy in Serbia would be jeopardized by
reopened discussions about Kosovo's future, which could fuel extremist
sympathy. The Commission argued that postponing the resolution would
actually increase the difficulty of resolving the issue in the future, once support
for the new democratic administration had subsided. 144
Next, the Goldstone Commission reviewed the concern that permitting
earned sovereignty for Kosovo could set off similar demands in Montenegro
and other regions. The Goldstone Commission argued that this concern was
overstated because the specific conditions for Kosovo's earned sovereignty
ruled out spillover effects, that earned sovereignty would eliminate many of
the current uncertainties in the region, that none of the other substate entities
possessed the same legal argument for independence (i.e., a history of
systematic human rights abuses), and that earned sovereignty was not any
more likely than the other proposed scenarios to generate domino effects. 145
Seeking to support this renewed initiative for earned sovereignty, while
recognizing the slow nature of political institution building in Kosovo, the
International Crisis Group ("ICG"), led by the former Australian Foreign
Minister, rejoined the debate and put forth a detailed proposal for a mixing of
international trusteeship and earned sovereignty for Kosovo.146 The
cornerstone of the proposal was a call for immediate negotiations on final
status, with UNMIK to then transfer increasing sovereign authority and
functions to Kosovar institutions, retaining only limited veto power in certain
areas. 147
The ICG proposal, which was based in the PILPG and Goldstone
precedents, extended the concept and argued for a renewed international
trusteeship. 148 The ICG argued that Kosovo's final status should be settled in
international agencies and foreign governments, and presumably be entitled to establish some form of
foreign mission. In particular, the Goldstone Commission thought it necessary for the Kosovar
government to be able to enter into relations with neighboring states. Absent such authority, it was
feared the Kosovar authorities would have little or no incentive to behave in a responsible manner
toward their neighboring states. Id. at 26.
143 Id. at 27-28.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, ICG BALKANS REPORT No. 124, A Kosovo ROADMAP (I):
ADDRESSING FINAL STATUS, iii-iv, 12-14 (2002), available at
htttp://www.crisisweb.org//library/documents/report-archive/A400561 01032002.pdf (last visited
Mar. 11, 2004).
147 Id. at i.
148 With respect to the nature of the proposed trusteeship, the International Crisis Group
("ICG") argued it should be less intrusive than the current SRSG arrangement, with the trustee simply
exercising veto powers either at large or in specifically defined areas. The ICG argued that the
Kosovo government should be permitted to exercise immediate responsibility for foreign policy, the
budget and matters of law and order. Id. at 12-13.
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conjunction with the running of the international trusteeship of Kosovo. At the
point where an international presence was no longer needed, Kosovar
institutions would be able to assume relevant sovereign powers and then step
into whatever status Kosovo possessed.149
The ICG proposal argued that a resolution of Kosovo's final status was
crucial to stability in the region. It believed that the uncertain process for
determining a final status was a significant obstacle to the normalization of
relations between the Albanian and Serb communities, and that it prolonged
each group's view that the other was a threat. The proposal further argued that
continued uncertainty threatened the political investment of the international
community in Kosovo and caused the unnecessary extension of the
peacekeeping presence. 150
Like the Goldstone proposal, the ICG proposal sought to refute the main
arguments that the European Union and others often made for postponing a
determination of Kosovo's final status. First, the ICG argued that the initiation
of final status talks would not set back Serbia's transition, as it was in fact the
lack of definition of Kosovo's final status which was beginning to undermine
Serbian stability and slow the transition to a non-nationalist state. Second, the
ICG argued that a determination of Kosovo's final status would not jeopardize
regional stability by encouraging other separatist movements in the region as
Kosovo's case was dissimilar to other regional groups, given its history as a
defined state within the former Yugoslavia and its status as a U.N. protectorate.
Finally, the ICG observed that, while some argued international consensus on
Kosovo was not strong enough to withstand reopening the issue, in fact, "the
international consensus has become a recipe for inertia." 151
The ICG argued that conditional independence, or earned sovereignty, was
the only final status option that satisfied all the key ingredients necessary for a
stable final status. While the ICG recognized that Kosovo was not yet
prepared to exercise full sovereignty, it reasoned that through a process of
earned sovereignty it would be able to earn this right and gradually prove itself
capable of full independence. According to the ICG, earned sovereignty would
also solidify Kosovo's status as an entity outside the sovereign control of the
FRY. International aid and investment-currently discouraged by the
uncertainty in Kosovo-would increase with a certain final status, and would
remain in Kosovo, since it would be unimpeded by fears that a fledgling nation
might prove itself unworthy of such inflow. The ICG also argued that by
"remaining on probation, Kosovar Albanians would have a strong incentive to
ensure that Kosovo would cease to be a factor of regional instability."152
The ICG then addressed a number of arguments that had been presented
against the approach of earned sovereignty. First, the ICG disputed the notion
that maintaining an uncertain prospect for independence preserved stability.
Rather, in the view of the ICG, it was the lack of certainty over Kosovo's
future that was a major contributing factor to regional instability. The ICG
149 Id. at i.
150 Id. at i.
151 Id. at ii.
152 Id. at 14.
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also argued that the fear of retaliation from the Serb community, which was
frequently invoked as an argument against earned sovereignty, was unfounded
because a democratically elected Serbian government was unlikely to call for
mass emigration in the face of final status. Another argument often presented
regarding Serbia was that final status for Kosovo would lead to an increase in
nationalist sentiment in Serbia, at the expense of moderates and stability. The
ICG rebutted this claim by noting that, if the goal was long-term stability,
preservation of an unstable entity and, with it, the possibility of another change
to Serbia's geography and demographics would only prolong the transition to a
stable democracy. Finally, the ICG refuted the claim that Kosovo would set a
precedent for other separatist movements in the region by presenting the key
difference between Kosovo and other areas: "Kosovo's interim status is
underpinned by a U.N. Resolution that leaves the question of final status
open." 153
E. Earned Sovereignty in the Form of Standards Before Status
Under increasing international pressure to adopt a clear approach for
resolving the crisis over Kosovo's final status, the U.N. SRSG adopted a
strategy referred to as Standards Before Status.154 This approach reflected the
core tenets of earned sovereignty, by calling for the measured devolution of
sovereign authority and functions to Kosovar institutions as they demonstrated
their capacity to operate effectively and meet select criteria. The approach
deviated from the earlier efforts of earned sovereignty in that it suspended the
discussion of final status until after certain standards were met.1 55 Earlier
manifestations of earned sovereignty had conditioned the transfer of authority
to the Kosovar institutions and the nature of its final status upon meeting
certain standards. The Standards Before Status proposal conditioned the
commencement of final status negotiations on meeting these standards.
The Standards Before Status approach represented an effort by the U.N. to
reach a compromise between the European Union's desire to delay a
determination of final status and others who sought to move Kosovo towards
independence so long as it met certain conditions. The SRSG argued that it
was necessary to condition the initiation of the talks on meeting certain
conditions, as discussions on final status would generate political instability,
which would undermine efforts to build Kosovar institutions. However, the
SRSG also attempted to soften the imposition of conditionality by stating that
if Kosovo were able to meet the standards set forth under its proposal, it would
be all but guaranteed independence as an outcome of the final status talks.1 56
153 Id. at 9.
154 Press Release, U.N. Mission in Kosovo, Address to Security Council by Michael Steiner,
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (July 30, 2002), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2002/pressr/pr792.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2004).
155 Specifically, the benchmarks covered the areas of functioning democratic institutions, rule
of law, freedom of movement, refugee returns and reintegration, economic reform and development,
property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the responsible operation of the Kosovo Protection Corps.
STANDARDS BEFORE STATUS, supra note 76.
156 As explained by the SRSG, the rationale behind this approach was that "Kosovo can only
advance towards a fair and just society when these minimum preconditions are met." Press Release,
U.N. Mission in Kosovo, supra note 154. Moreover, Steiner argued, these standards also mirrored
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The establishment of clear standards, while somewhat utopian in nature,
was welcomed as a means of moving forward on the development of Kosovar
institutions and on the question of final status. However, the conditioning of
final status talks on meeting these standards was met with substantial
criticism. 157 Under this approach, a date would be set for the beginning of
final status talks, with the conditions applicable to the rate of devolution of
sovereign authority and functions and to the nature of the final status, not to the
initiation of the final status talks.
In response to the increasing demands of democratically elected Kosovar
leaders, in December 2003 the United Nations released a Kosovo Standards
Implementation Plan which detailed precise criteria for determining whether
the standards were met. 158 This document coincided with a joint declaration
made in Kosovo by Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman and the SRSG
setting Spring 2005 as the time for beginning the process for making a final
status determination. 159 The Grossman declaration had the effect of delinking
the conditions from the timing of the final status talks, and linking them to the
nature of the final status to be determined. To prepare for Spring 2005, the
SRSG immediately began a process of devolving substantial powers and
authority to the Kosovar institutions.
CONCLUSION
The conflict resolution approach of earned sovereignty has emerged as a
response to the increasingly limited utility of the "sovereignty first" and "self-
determination first" approaches to resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. As
self-determination movements become increasingly intertwined with global
terrorist networks, and as "local conflicts" increasingly undermine regional
stability, as in the case of Kashmir, diplomats are in need of a larger tool kit of
approaches for resolving sovereignty-based conflicts. Moreover, as
international human rights norms take on increasing salience, governments,
pushed by public opinion, are less willing to permit sovereignty-based conflicts
to be resolved through the unrestrained use of force, which frequently leads to
massive human rights violations.
those that were required to be considered for integration into Europe: "I offer this to you as an 'exit
strategy' which is, in reality, an 'entry strategy' into the European integration process. The
benchmarks complement the preconditions that Kosovo needs to meet to qualify for the Stabilisation
and Association process." Id.
157 For instance, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, together with PILPG,
undertook to persuade international policymakers that a more appropriate approach would be
standards with status. J. BUGAJSKI, R. HITCHNER & P. WILLIAMS, ACHIEVING A FINAL STATUS
SETTLEMENT FOR KosOvo 9 (CSIS Monograph, Apr. 2003), available at http://www.csis.org/
ee/kosovo final status.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2001).
158 See U.N. MISSION IN Kosovo, KOSOVO STANDARDS IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (December
2003), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/KSIP-Eng.pdf.
159 Press Release, United States Department of State, United Nations Mission In Kosovo Press
Conference With Special Representative of the Secretary General Harri Kolkeri (Nov. 5, 2003)
(quoting Undersecretary Grossman as stating, "[t]he Contact Group, and I know that the Secretary
General's Special Representative agrees, that there would then be the evaluation of Kosovo's progress
toward these U.N. standards by mid 2005 and even earlier if progress is sufficient").
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2004 Earned Sovereignty
The approach of earned sovereignty as developed in recent state practice
seeks to bridge the "sovereignty first" and "self-determination first"
approaches and draw on their strengths while minimizing their disadvantages.
In particular, earned sovereignty seeks to permit the legitimate realization of a
people's right to self-determination in a manner which protects the interests of
the parent state and can be accomplished in a way which minimizes local and
regional instability. Additionally, this approach may offer lessons for a broad
array of conflict resolution situations, beyond the classic scenario involving the
breakup or seccession of states. The current situation in Iraq differs in
important ways from the cases described in this Article; most importantly the
final status of the territory (i.e., Iraq as a sovereign nation) is not in question.
However, the process thus far has included significant elements of phased
sovereignty, and the continued security presence of the U.S. military represents
an undeniable constraint on Iraq's sovereignty. In administering the ongoing
process of transition in that country, the elements of earned sovereignty may
offer valuable lessons. And in evaluating progress in Iraq from an earned
sovereignty perspective, the approach may be refined further.
By following a measured process for the resolution of a sovereignty-based
dispute, the earned sovereignty approach creates an opportunity for states to
minimize many of the destabilizing factors associated with immediate
secession. The application of conditions to the increased assumption of
sovereign authority and functions by a substate entity creates a highly effective
means for influencing the behavior of the substate entity in order to ensure the
protection of legitimate interests of the parent state and the international
community.
The ability to determine the final status of the substate entity years after
the initial peace agreement provides an opportunity for the parties to make a
decision on final status at a time when passions are not inflamed by an ongoing
armed conflict. The approach also permits a more rational, deliberative
process, which may involve the international community in some form.
Similarly, the involvement of the international community in institution
building benefits the state and substate entity by enabling the creation of
institutions necessary to ensure the stable operation of the substate entity,
either as a new state or as a province with heightened autonomy. The creation
of domestic institutions also provides the state and the international community
with an additional point of contact to pressure the substate entity, which
facilitates the protection of legitimate interests, such as the protection of
minority rights, and responsible regional behavior.
Like any approach to conflict resolution, there are risks associated with
earned sovereignty. The approach may create an irreversible expectation of
independence on the part of the substate entity, as reflected in experiences in
Northern Ireland, southern Sudan, and Montenegro. In addition, the conditions
may not be taken seriously and may only be minimally met. Alternately, the
conditions may be so difficult to attain that a substate entity finds itself locked
in an unending effort to meet unachievable goals, with the consequence that
tensions are exacerbated rather than relieved. This dynamic describes in part
the unstable, yet politically adaptive, developments in Kosovo, and may even
offer insight into the difficulties moving ahead in the Israel/Palestine
negotiations. These concerns may be effectively managed, however, by the
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good faith involvement of international actors and by a precise drafting of the
peace agreement. In the end, the approach of earned sovereignty provides an
additional tool for parties and mediators to structure the resolution of
sovereignty-based disputes in a manner that promotes regional stability,
minimizes human rights violations, and removes an impetus for the further
spread of increasingly destructive terrorist organizations.
